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 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
 
The major findings answering partly three of t h e  f i v e  m a j o r  D E M P A T E M  q u e s t i o n s  ( s e e 
DEMPATEM 2000) are:  
1) Does the higher share of service industries in employment in the US derive 
from a larger role of services in the structure of final demand, and is this gap 
growing?  
•   The US have a higher share of services in final demand of about 10%-points but 
all countries show a trend towards services in final demand.   
•    There is a clear trend to a higher share of services in final demand also in 
constant prices within countries. Using constant instead of current prices flattens the 
trend towards services in final demand but it remains.  
•   The lead of the US in the service share in final demand occurs in current and in 
constant prices but it seems stable over time.  
•   The bigger service sector in the US occurs in different data sets. Also as a share 
in value added the service sector in the US is bigger than in Europe.   
•   Overall services rise in relative prices whereas overall goods prices are falling in 
every country. Some service prices rise more than the average, but not all.  
•   Relative prices for goods rather than for services seems to be lower in the US 
than in Europe. This is mainly the result of relatively low prices for health and education 
in Europe, which are usually mixed public-private services in Europe. Other services, 
especially ‘market services’ have substantially lower relative prices in the US.   
•  Measured in international prices the gap in relative service demand between the 
US and the European countries narrows but the gap remains.   
 
2) Particularly, is consumer demand higher and growing more rapidly in the US? 
What is its impact on the production of services?  
and  
3) What is the role of the pattern of consumption in this? I.e., do American 
households consume more services than European households and why?  
 •  In all countries, private consumption is the most important demand component 
for services followed by government consumption, which, together, account for about 
80 to 95% of all final demand for servcies.   
•  Imports (and exports) of services are marginal in overall final demand and in 
household final consumption.  
•  In the US the share of private consumption in the overall demand for services is 
especially high, which favors the share of services in final demand.  
•  Especially the share of services in private consumption grew in the US,   
•  There is a clear trade-off between private and public expenditures on services 
depending on the national institutional arrangements. In part American households 
spend a higher share of their disposable incomes on services because they need to buy 
services, which are provided publicly in Europe.  
•  The share of individual consumption in total public consumption is much higher 
in Europe than in the US.  
•  Collective consumption in GDP is roughly similar in all countries. If anything it is 
higher in the US.  
•  There is no clear pattern in the US-European difference of private final 
consumption even in categories where public provision is unimportant (like ‘restaurants, 
hotels’) the pattern is divers. The UK and France have higher expenditure shares, 
Germany and the Netherlands have lower shares than the US.  
•  In the US with increasing importance up to the mid 1990s when investment 
grew substantially.  
•  The employment share in services seems to be influenced by the relative service 
productivity, which may be related to differences in skill structure and/or capital 
deepening.  
•  Demand per head of the population in working age is about 40% higher in the 
US than in Europe, which affects both goods and services.  
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1 INTRODUCTION: STRUCTURAL ECONOMIC DYNAMICS  
 
1.1 MAJOR QUESTIONS  
All ‘highly industrialized’ economies were ‘service economies’ by the turn of the century. For 
decades net employment growth occurred in the service sector only, while manufacturing 
employment was on the decline. This trend was clearly led by the US, where, at the 
beginning of the 21st century, 55% of its working age population (15-64) was employed in 
services compared to about 40% in a typical European country. The US also integrated an 
increasing share of its working age population into employment, achieving an employment-
population rate of 75% in 2001 compared to about 65% in a typical European country. At the 
dawn of the 21st century it is the rule for an American woman to work, whereas in several 
European countries less than half of the female working age population has a job. The 
divergence in employment trends between the US and Europe occurred since about 1970 
when most European countries had similar or higher employment rates than the US (Figure 
1.1). The different trends are even sharper if working hours are taken into account (Figure 
1.2).  
Rising employment-population rates in the US coinciding with the expansion of service 
sector employment has led many economists to search for institutional explanations for the 
diverging US-Europe employment trends. Most popular is the view that American labor 
market institutions permit flexible wages, which allow service industries that suffer from 
technological stagnancy to expand. According to this hypothesis Americans accept high and 
rising inequality as the price for high employment (inequality hypothesis or wage-
compression hypothesis). In Europe, on the contrary, it is argued that high minimum wages -
caused by high unearned income from the social security system, or by high statutory 
minimum wages, or high bargained wages respectively- prevent service industries to expand 
and thus create a lack of jobs for low-skilled workers. Wages affect prices and overly high 
wages and corresponding prices extinguish whole (service) industries. American institutions, 
so the argument goes, integrate a large part of the population, including the low-skilled, into 
employment at the price of high inequality. European institutions on the other hand prevent 
high and rising inequality at the price of the exclusion of especially low-skilled workers from 
employment. Although the inequality hypothesis fits the aggregate data well, detailed studies 
fail to establish this relation (for a summary see Freeman/Schettkat, 2002).   
1  
Source: Economic Outlook, OECD Statistical Compendium, 2000 #2.  
Calculation: Employment (total or in services) / Population between 15-64 years old.  
 
2  
Source: O’Mahoney (2002), CBS Statline (online), OECD (2000).  
Calculation: Employment * Annual Hours worked / pop15-64 * avg. hours worked 1970 
 
Given the European belief in institutional differences as the major cause for US-European 
service employment differences it may be surprising that many studies that focus especially 
on services argue that employment in service industries depends mainly (if not solely) on per 
capita income. Wealthier societies have a higher share of service employment either because 
3 they demand more services (hierarchy of needs hypothesis) or because service provision is 
technologically stagnant and therefore experiences rising relative prices, which result in a 
larger share of current expenditures and employment to be allocated to services. The latter 
is Baumol’s cost disease (cost disease hypothesis), which assumes, contrary to the hierarchy 
of needs hypothesis, that demand for services in constant prices is fixed and does not rise 
with per-capita income. Thus, according to Baumol’s hypothesis, the rising share of services 
in employment and nominal GDP is due to technological stagnancy in services but 
technological progress in the rest of the economy (i.e. in manufacturing). In his 1980 paper 
on Economic Growth and the Rise of Service Employment, Victor Fuchs was able to show that 
the share of service employment in overall employment indeed follows a predictable logistic 
curve against income per capita. Surprisingly enough the Fuchs model still holds after 25 
years (see section 2.3 of this paper). But Fuchs also pointed out that the rising labor force 
participation of women might lead to a different demand structure favoring services (which 
is one of the major hypotheses guiding DEMPATEM). Households may outsource part of 
their own production. This means that the way a certain level of income per capita is 
created is also important, and big differences exist on either side of the Atlantic.  
The regularity of service sector employment in relation to per-capita income between and 
within countries over time, is quite astonishing. This regularity, though, is as much a 
theoretical phenomenon as an irregular development would be, because so many variables 
(besides income) may affect service employment. What underlying structures and 
mechanisms lead to this phenomenon? What forces determine the expansion of service 
employment?  
In general, the industry structure of employment may differ between two countries for 
several reasons:  
-  Differences in per-capita income  
-  Differences in final product demand  
-  Differences in relative prices  
-  Differences in the vertical organization of production (integration and outsourcing of 
various tasks)  
-  Differences in productivity between industries (technology, skills, capital deepening)  
-  Differences in working hours between industries  
 
4 These differences may again be caused by numerous variables. For example, the differences 
in relative final demand for services may be due to differences in the weights of the various 
aggregate final-demand components (private consumption, government consumption, 
investment, imports, exports) and differences in service shares within these components, 
which again may be caused by differences in income levels, tastes, prices, household 
composition, specialization in the economy. Furthermore, as has been argued by William 
Baumol, the share of service employment may increase even without any changes in relative 
real demand for services, but only through the lack of productivity growth in service 
activities. Rising income in combination with unbalanced productivity growth can result in 
the expansion of service employment. Thus, the analysis of the employment structure is 
necessarily complex and there can hardly be any straightforward answer to why one country 
has a higher share of service employment than another.  
DEMPATEM analyzes the causal mechanisms between economic growth and service demand 
and the reverse causation that service sector expansion promotes economic growth. 
DEMPATEM intends to provide a better understanding of the mechanisms that create the 
US-European employment gap, thus giving impetus to the general debate on employment 
policies in Europe. The project moves beyond the simple use of more (US) vs. less (EU) 
inequality to which the employment gap is too often ascribed, although distributional issues 
are taken into account. DEMPATEM looks simultaneously at the product market and the 
labor market in a systematic and comparative fashion, using different data sources. To our 
knowledge DEMPATEM is the first project that develops such an integrated approach, 
spanning product and labor markets in an international comparison of employment trends 
and their causes. Changing structures are related to long-term changes and the relevant 
periods here are the 1970s, 80s and 90s.   
DEMPATEM analyses the full complexity of the differences in industry structure of 
employment using the US as the benchmark country. The major questions are (DEMPATEM 
proposal, p. 6):  
1.   Does the higher share of service industry employment in the US derive from a larger 
role of services in the structure of final demand, and is this gap growing?  
2.   Particularly, is consumer demand higher and growing more rapidly in the US? What is its 
impact on the production of services?  
3.  What is the role of the pattern of consumption in this? I.e. do American household 
consume more services than European households do and why.  
5 4.   What determines the pattern of consumption? What role do household characteristics, 
including labor participation, income inequality and consumer attitudes play?  
5.   How does consumer spending on services translate into the structure of production and 
employment?  
6.   What is the structure of employment in these industries by skills, gender, age, and pay? 
And how does this depend on female labor supply?  
This paper partly tackles questions one to three.  
1.2 WHY FOCUSING ON SERVICES? ARE SERVICES DIFFERENT FROM 
GOODS?  
DEMPATEM focuses on services, but actually 'service' is an amorphous concept (Griliches, 
1992) that lacks a clear-cut definition, even though many efforts have been made to clearly 
distinguish services from goods. The sharpest description of the difference between goods 
and services is probably that a service is ‘something that you can’t drop on your foot’ 
(Harker, 1995: 1). Often, negative definitions are applied, which merely define what a service 
is not. Services cannot be stored, and the production and consumption of services (often) 
occur simultaneously. Services may therefore require time both from its producer and from 
its consumer (Petit, 2000)1. In several cases, the quality of the service depends on the 
participation of the consumer (Griliches, 1992: 5), as in the case of education, where a tutor 
will achieve nothing without her student’s cooperation.  
However, to assert that services are time consuming, would be an invalid generalization. 
Although it may be true for some consumer services (such as haircuts, tennis lessons and 
the like) it does not apply to all activities that are classified as services. Consultancy, tax and 
cleaning services, for example, may be aimed at saving the 'consumer’s' time. There are also 
activities that are classified as services, but which cannot easily be distinguished from goods-
production activities. ’Car repairs’, for example, are classified as services, although roughly 
70% of the time spent on a car repair can be classified as goods rather than service 
production (Freeman/Schettkat, 1999).   
The service sector is very heterogeneous. Service activities can be found in each sector of 
the economy, which makes the range of skill requirements and wages as heterogeneous as 
the economy itself (Freeman/Schettkat, 1998, 1999). The major question probably is, 
whether the professional provision of services delivers a productivity gain for individuals and 
for society as a whole. Therefore, it may be useful to distinguish services requiring expertise, 
6 that is that services in which the professional provider has a productivity advantage, from 
services that do not require expertise and for which the productivity differential between 
market provision (buying) and self-provision is minimal. Another distinction should be made 
by the main user of the service, i.e. whether it is an intermediate or a consumer services 
(including public services) although most  services are intermediate and final at the same 
time (Schettkat/ Yocarini 2003). Consumer services can in turn be divided into services that 
are time consuming and services that are time saving; compare a meal in a first-class 
restaurant with a meal in a McDonald’s.    
An additional problem is that measuring the quality of services is extremely difficult2. Does a 
shop provide a better service if it has longer opening hours or if it arranges its goods nicely? 
'What is the productivity of a milkman?', is a famous question asked by Nicolas Kaldor 
(1966). Does the milkman double his productivity if he drops off two bottles of milk instead 
of one? It is often thought that output measurements are easier in the manufacturing 
industry than in the service sector because output is more homogeneous (Griliches, 1992: 
7). Although this argument has certain validity, quality changes in manufacturing products 
have also been difficult to measure. If the price of a car increases by 10%, how much of that 
increase is caused by improvements in the car, and how much just results from inflation? (Oi 
and Rosen, 1992, Gordon 1990, Gordon, 1998). This has been a problem ever since the 
National Income and Product Accounts statistics were first created and it has never fully 
been solved3. 
Professional services, such as legal advice, tax and accounting consultancies, are bought in 
the market because it would be impossible for each household or small firm to gain the 
necessary expertise. The concentration of expertise in certain professions thus creates 
'economies of scale' as the huge 'fixed investment' in human capital can be spread over many 
users. Because of such economies of scale, services requiring professional expertise can be 
acquired much cheaper from external providers than by internal provision. This helps to 
explain why firms outsource some services rather than produce them in-house.  
Professionalization mainly affects so-called business services, but the distinction between 
                                                                                                                                         
1   Time can be seen as a constraint on consumption (Petit, 2000). Scarcity of leisure may therefore result in 
more 'efficient consumption' as Linder (Linder, 1970), and more recently the Economist (Economist, 1997), 
have pointed out with respect to the 'American way of leisure'.   
2    Services and their quality changes formed the heart of the debates about the validity of the US CPI 
(Consumer Price Index), see: Boskin et al. 1998, Abraham et al. 1998. 
3   OECD (1996) gives an overview of various methods used to estimate real value added in services ranging 
from double deflation –regarded as preferable (page 7)- to direct deflation by a wage rate index. 
7 business and consumer services is rather blurred. Legal and tax advice, for example, are also 
'consumed' by private households and the professionalization advantage also works for many 
consumer services. Private households may also apply the principle of opportunity costs 
when deciding whether to purchase services or to opt for self-provision. Especially if the 
service requires little expertise, like cleaning (Schettkat, 2002). The productivity of such 
services will be roughly equal for self-provision and purchased services. Taking set-up costs 
into account (for example, travel time to the place of service provision) may increase the 
efficiency advantage of self-provision even further.   
Another argument is that all products are composite products. There are no services 
without any goods as intermediate input and no goods without some intermediate service 
input4. So why does DEMPATEM focus so much on services while services are not a clear-
cut category? There are several answers:  
1.    The major differences in employment-population rates between the US and 
Europe occur in service industries. The ‘Employment in Europe 2002’ report of the 
European Commission shows (page 29) that the difference in sectoral employment 
structure between the EU and the US is entirely in service industries.   
2.    Services are assumed to have a high income elasticity (some of these 
assumptions will be investigated in this paper, others are evaluated in other DEMPATEM 
sub-projects, e.g. income elasticity in the DEMPATEM Consumption and Input-Output 
papers)  
3.   Services are assumed to be technologically stagnant or at least asymptotically 
stagnant  
4.   Services are assumed to experience higher price rises than goods  
5.   Services are assumed to be less capital and more labor intensive  
6.   Service demand mainly affects the domestic economy and inter-country service 
demand differences may be especially relevant for employment  
 
Table 1.1 shows employment measured by employment-population rates (population 15-64 
                                                  
4   Sometimes it is argued that services depend on good production; i.e. nobody can live on services alone. This is 
true, but it does not mean that services cannot capture a big share of the economy. We still need agriculture, 
but only a very small fraction of the labor force is occupied in agriculture and still production is higher than 
ever. The reason is that productivity growth in agriculture has outpaced demand growth, leading to a decline 
in agricultural employment. Similarly, manufacturing employment may decline sharply for the same reason: 
productivity rising faster than demand. For many services, however, the reverse holds (Gregory/ Russo 2003). 
8 years) and final demand and consumption per head of the population 15-64 years by broad 
sectors in % of the US figures. Many European countries have employment and final demand 
figures close to or even higher than the US in manufacturing but the gaps are substantial for 
services. Somehow the major difference between th US and the DEMPATEM countries 
seems to originate in services This investigates some of the causes. 
 
Table 1.1 Employment, final demand and private household consumption per head of population (15-64 
years, US=100, 1995)  
  US*  UK*  F    GER  NL  ES 
     Employment (FTEs)      
 Overall   100   86.4   78.6     87.6   77.6   69.8  
Agriculture   100   73.7   143.3     94.3   105.6   189.9  
Manufacturing   100   109.1   93.3   137.4   88.6   94.3  
Services   100   81.9   71.9     70.7   73.4   58.1  
      Final Demand       
Overall   100   78.3   70.7     65.2   82.9   50.1  
Agriculture   100   112.8   91.0     56.3   234.9   94.8  
Manufacturing   100   94.8   92.8     88.9   99.9   62.4  
Services   100   67.6   59.8     54.1   72.0   43.4  
    
 Consumption  
    
Overall   100   70.3   63.3     54.8   56.8   42.6  
Agriculture   100   141.9   150.6     93.8   47.5   129.0  
Manufacturing   100   90.1   83.7     59.1   38.2   49.8  
Services   100   63.0   58.2     53.6   60.9   40.5  
Source: Computations based on OECD Input-Output database for demand and STAN for employment.  
* US data refers to 1998, UK data refers to 1997  
 
1.3 OUTLINE OF THE PAPER  
This paper mainly investigates the first three DEMPATEM question, namely:   
•   Does the higher share of service industry employment in the US derive from a 
larger role of services in the structure of final demand, and is this gap growing?  
•   Particularly, is consumer demand higher and growing more rapidly in the US? 
What is its impact on the production of services?  
•    What is the role of the pattern of consumption in this? I.e. do American 
household consume more services than European households do and why.  
 
The paper also links demand to employment. First up is an overview of income and 
productivity and differences in the growth process of the US, the UK, France, Germany, the 
9 Netherlands and Spain (the DEMPATEM countries). Then a model of economic structure 
will be sketched, that shows that, the share of services in expenditures (ALPHAs), but also 
the relative productivity of services (BETAs) determine the employment structure. Thus, the 
major variables of the ‘hierarchy of needs’ hypothesis (the structure of demand) and the 
‘cost disease’ hypothesis (relative productivity growth rates) are analyzed. The emphasis will 
be on demand trends.  
10 2 INCOME, PRODUCTIVITY, AND EMPLOYMENT  
 
2.1 INCOME AND PRODUCTIVITY LEVELS  
Level estimates of GDP per capita show convergence between Europe and the US up to the 
1980’s, but divergence afterwards (see Table 2.1)5. GDP per employed person, however, 
continues to converge to the US level, indicating a change in the income generating process 
in the US compared to the European countries. Most remarkably, GDP per hour worked in 
Europe converged to US levels, even though average hours worked, which remained roughly 
constant in the US, declined markedly in Europe. Measured in GDP per capita the European 
countries are clearly behind the US, but measured in GDP per hour worked (i.e. 
productivity) many European countries are at similar levels as the US (see Table 2.1, 
Gordon, 2002, Freeman/Schettkat, 2002, Bailey/Solow 20016). Thus, it may well be that the 
US achieved a higher service employment share due to higher per capita income, but most 
theories of expanding nominal service demand assume that per-capita income grows through 
technological progress rather than through additional labor input. But, the difference in per 
capita income between some European countries and the US is clearly achieved through 
higher labor input in the US, rather than higher productivity. Higher labor input itself, 
however, may also affect service demand.  
                                                  
5   The data shown in Table 2.1 is based on 1999 EKS PPPs, the most recent benchmark of the OECD (2002). 
Data from BLS (2000), for example, show similar trends, but at times deviate by about 5%-points from the 
OECD estimates. 
6   Bailey/ Solow (2001) restrict their estimates of the level productivity to the market sector and find (2001: 
154): ‘… a modest gap between the United States and the continental European countries, at around 10 
percent for France and Germany. Within a reasonable margin of error, we can say that the Netherlands is 
very close to both the United States at one end and also to France and West Germany.’ 
11 Table 2.1 Real GDP per capita and per employed person (United States = 100) 
   
 
Computations OECD Section based on: OECD Statistical Compendium, 2000 #2, OECD (PPPs and Real Expenditures, 1999 
Benchmark Year ). Hours from O’Mahoney, OECD (Spain & Sweden), CBS (Netherlands). Calculations: these values were 
obtained by dividing the GDP of the individual countries (after converting it to US dollars using the 1999 EKS PPPs) by 
population, employment, or total hours worked respectively and then setting the US at 100 for the individual years. Source: BLS, 
Comparative Real Gross Domestic Product Per Capita and Per Employed Person, Tables 2 & 4, p.9, 11. 
 
1) 
Before 1990 the OECD Data covers Western Germany  
 
 
Differences in GDP per capita can be decomposed into different parts: one representing 
differences in productivity, another representing differences in average working hours and a 
third representing differences in employment population rates (Table 2.2).7 Although the 
output (GDP) as well as the input measures (hours worked) are estimates and should 
                                                  
7
 
12 therefore be investigated carefully, they show a remarkable development of productivity 
(GDP per hour) in Europe. In the 1960s the productivity level in Europe was about half the 
US level but in 1990 many European countries (West-Germany, France, the Netherlands) 
achieved similar productivity levels as the US. The latter, however, regained the lead again in 
the late 1990s, when the widely discussed productivity growth recovery started, which was 
too quickly classified as the ‘new economy’ with never-ending growth (for a critical 
discussion of the ‘New Economy’, see Gordon, 2000). Although the recovery of US 
productivity growth seems to be investment driven (see also below) and highest in durable 
manufacturing, service industries seem to have benefited as well (see for estimates based on 
gross output: Stiroh, 2002: 1564).     
Lower employment-population rates, except for the Netherlands and Sweden, and lower 
average working hours (especially in the Netherlands) reduce income per capita in most 
European countries compared to the US. Except for the UK, Spain and Sweden productivity 
differentials to the US are minor. Longer working hours compensate the productivity gap in 
Spain but the low employment population rate reinforces it. These cross-country differences 
hint to major differences in the growth path of the economies. Small differences should not 
be taken overly serious, given the estimation character of the underlying data (see Appendix 
I for discussion of working hour estimates). Nevertheless, productivity trends, working hour 
trends and employment population trends are substantial and these trends are significantly 
different in Europe compared to the US.  
13 Table 2.2 Decomposition of cross-country differences in GDP per Capita.  
 
Source:  OECD (2000). Hours from O’Mahoney, OECD & CBS.  
 
2.2 COMPONENTS OF GROWTH  
Table 2.3 shows the productivity catch-up of Europe but also the differences in working 
hours and employment-population rates, revealing substantial inter-period differences in the 
contribution of the three components to the US-Europe income-per capita gaps. Growth in 
income-per-capita (rather than the levels) is decomposed in a component reflecting changes 
in labor market engagements (employment population rates), labor productivity and hours 
14 worked.8
 
This simple decomposition-exercise reveals the dramatic change in processes 
underlying economic growth between countries and over time.  
First, it is obvious that in every country income per capita and labor productivity grew at 
much lower rates after the 1970’s than before. Growth rates of income per capita differ 
much less between countries after the 70’s than before. Most important, up to the 1970’s 
growth in income per capita was primarily determined by the growth in labor productivity 
accounting for about 90% or more of income growth. After the 1970’s, income in the US 
(but also in Sweden) grew through higher employment population rates compensated by 
modest reductions in average hours worked. In contrast, in the European countries labor 
productivity growth continued to be the major sources of income growth compensated by 
reduction in average hours worked and lower employment population rates.    
It is one of the core hypotheses of DEMPATEM that difference in the growth process 
between Europe and the US changed the employment and hence the consumption patterns.  
The inter-period differences in the growth patterns support the supply-side part of this 
hypothesis. Although in the 1990’s the US seemed to be back at productivity growth 
patterns of the 1960’s when GDP growth was generated by rising productivity, the 
employment-population rate continued to increase in the US, although less than in other 
periods.  
                                                  
8   
 
15 Table 2.3    Components of Growth in three different periods.  
 
Source: Computations based on: Economic Outlook (OECD, 2000), hours: O’Mahoney, CBS & OECD.  
1
Does not include growth in the year of German unification (1991).  
GDPpc = GDP per capita in working age  
 
 
2.3 INCOME AND THE EMPLOYMENT SHARE OF SERVICES: EXTENDING 
THE FUCHS ANALYSIS  
Building on the basic assumption that at zero income per capita, economies will employ all 
labor in agriculture and none in services, while at higher levels of income this pattern will be 
reversed, Victor Fuchs (1980) developed a non-linear model of the development of the share 
of service employment in overall employment. In this model the share of service 
employment starts at zero (at zero GDP) and grows with GDP, asymptotically approaching 
one. The share of agricultural employment, on the other hand, starts at one and then 
decreases with GDP asymptotically approaching zero. Fuchs used the following equations:  









The share of industry employment is one minus the two shares.  
16 where GDPpc is GDP per capita and β, α, δ, γ are parameters to be estimated.   
Fuchs estimated the parameters of his nonlinear model with time series data for the US 
(1870 to 1978) and with cross-country data from OECD (1960, 1970, 1980). He showed 
that this model predicts the service share in overall employment remarkably well. The 
coefficients of correlation between the actual and predicted values of the service share in 
employment were between 0.80 and 0.99. We applied Victor Fuchs’ model to more recent 
data and again Fuchs’s model predicts the share of services in overall employment 
remarkably well.  
 
Table 2.4  Regression Results: sector shares of civilian employment as a function of GDP per capita, US 
and OECD   Time Series.  
   
Source: Computations based on OECD Economic Outlook database, OECD Annual Labor Force Statistics, OECD PPPs and Real 
Expenditures (1999 Benchmark Year) 
Note: Standard Errors in parentheses.   
1) 
The coefficients from Fuchs’ work differ from ours, because Fuchs used GDPpc in 1970 US$ while we used 1999 dollars and 
PPPs. In 1999 PPPs the horizontal axis is more stretched, which results in different values for the coefficients.  
2)
 Includes Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK & US  
 
Table 2.4 displays the coefficients estimated by Fuchs and our own estimates. The 
correlation coefficients between the predicted values and actual values are all around 0.6 or 
higher (see Table 2.6). As expected, they are generally higher for time-series than for cross-
sections. The fit of the Fuchs model is also illustrated in Figures 2.1 and 2.2. Figure 2.1 shows 
17 the predicted trend of the service share in employment based on 22 OECD countries (not 
including the US) and the actual values for the US between 1960 and 2001, when the US 
achieved per-capita income between 13,800 and 36,700 US$ (in constant prices). The US 
does not seem to be an exceptional case: it is developing roughly along the estimated curve, 
with service shares in employment above until 1996, and slightly below after 1997. It seems 
that much of the higher share in service employment in the US is related to a higher level of 
income per capita. However, the function in Figure 2.1 for 22 OECD countries is based on 
income per capita values, which are fairly below the actual US values in the alter years. 
Therefore we also show the predicted service share using US coefficients obtained from the 
US time series (1960 to 2001) and the actual service shares of the DEMPATEM countries for 
selected years (Figure 2.2). The figure shows that countries such as the Netherlands, France 
and the UK reach even higher service employment shares than the US at certain levels of 
per capita GDP. Germany, on the other hand, is systematically below the predicted values 
although part-time shares are similar in the US and in Germany. However, the employment 
shares are based on persons and it has to be kept in mind though, that hours worked are 
not accounted for. If a large part of employment in the service sector works part-time (like 
in the Netherlands), these employment shares will overestimate the size of the service 
sector. Table  
2.5 suggests they do, because hours per person employed are lower in service industries 
than in the rest of the economy although hours worked seem to be difficult to measure (see 
Appendix I). 
 
Table 2.5 Hours worked per employed person in services in % of hours worked per employed in the rest 
of the economy (1999)  
US1)   UK1)   FR1)   GER1)   NL2)   ES  
Services   1629   1588   1509   1563   1371    
Rest   1998   1893   1625   1583   1572    




 Computations based on O’Mahoney’s NISEC ‘02 Dataset 
2)
 Computations based on OECD Structural Analysis 
industrial database (STAN ) 
  
Fuchs points out that accurate and stable predictions are not so common in economics and 
he explicitly mentions that one has to be aware that these results are “not tests of 
theoretically grounded hypotheses”. No appropriate economic theory has been developed 
to explain this phenomenon. Consequently, a major question is why this pattern is so 
persistent. Is it due to shifts in demand, a new industrial division of labor (outsourcing), or 
was Baumol correct in pointing at differential productivity growth in the different sectors? 
18 How can it be that GDP per capita influences these factors so consistently even in such 
widely diverging institutional frameworks and differences in growth processes (see above)?  
Fig. 2.1 Predicted Service Share OECD and Actual Values United States (1960-2001)  
 
Fig. 2.2 Predicted Service Share in Employment United States and Actual Values UK,  
Netherlands, Germany, France and Spain (1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000)  
 
 
19 Table 2.6 Coefficients of correlation between actual and predicted service sector shares of employment, 
US and OECD Time series, and OECD cross-sections  
       Actual Share      
Predicted share,   US   OECD   OECD   OECD   OECD   OECD   OECD  
based on:   1960-01   1960   1970   1980   1990   2001   1960-01  
US 1960-2001   .981   .724   .636   .646   .570   .632   .850  
OECD 1960   .980   .723   .634   .643   .565   .630   .850  
OECD 1970   .980   .723   .634   .643   .564   .630   .850  
OECD 1980   .981   .723   .634   .644   .566   .631   .850  
OECD 1990   .980   .726   .637   .646   .569   .631   .850  
OECD 2001   .981   .725   .637   .647   .570   .632   .850  
OECD 1960-2001   .981   .720   .633   .643   .567   .632   .851  
For Fuchs’ correlation coefficients see  footnote9. 
 
How does employment in services relate to other variables like value added? Does it 
develop in line with the service employment share? The comparison of the service share in 
value added and in employment can produce useful information on the trends in relative 
productivity of services. If productivity growth is low in services, the share of service in value 
added should have a flatter slope than the service share in employment. As William Baumol 
and Edward Wolff (1984) pointed out, does value added per worker (a common proxy for 
labor productivity) tend to equalize in functioning labor markets. This is actually the basis for 
Baumol’s ‘cost disease’ and it is intuitively clear if one assumes for simplicity that value added 
consists of wages only. In a perfect labor market, similarly qualified workers will earn the 
same wage independent of their industry. Thus, value added per worker in nominal terms 
will be roughly the same throughout the economy and it is therefore meaningless as a 
measure for relative industry productivity.10 However, similar problems occur when 
referring to constant-price value added share.   
Constant-price value added per worker depends on the base year in which constant and 
current price value-added are equal. With different price trends, the difference value-added 
per worker between two industries is just a function of time and with the ‘right’ base year 
any difference in industry ‘productivity’ levels can be produced (Baumol/ Wolff 1984). For 
productivity level comparisons between industries, the common output unit is missing. 
Oranges are different from apples although we may assign money values to them.   
                                                  
9   Predicted share, Actual Share  
based on: US 1870-1978 OECD 1960 OECD 1970 OECD 1976  
US 1870-1978 .987 .796 .842 .871   
OECD 1960 .987 .796 .842 .870   
OECD 1970 .987 .796 .842 .869   
OECD 1976 .987 .796 .842 .869  
Source: Fuchs, 1980, p. 10 
10   Work by Krueger and Summers (1988) showed, however, that industry wage differentials are obviously 
persistent and not transitory, which hints to labor market imperfections. 
20 Nevertheless, the growth rates or time trends are informative and Figure 2.3 displays 
estimated values for the service share in value added in current prices and in constant prices 
of 1970, as well as the service share in employment. The two functions for value added cross 
in 1970 (the base year for constant prices) and the current shares are constantly above the 
constant-price shares, which illustrates the effect of Baumol’s ‘cost disease’. This indicates 
either labor market imperfections or differences in the skill composition of employment. 
Germany and the US may represent two extremes here: in the US the employment share is 
constantly above the value added share, hinting to shorter relative working hours in US 
services (see Table 2.5) and/or a larger share of low skilled labor in the US service industries 
(Freeman/Schettkat 1999). In Germany the reverse occurs: the value added function is 
constantly above the employment function reflecting the high relative working hours in 
German services (Table 2.5) and the higher skill level in German services (see Freeman/ 
Schettkat 1999 and also Schettkat, 1992). In many countries (France, the Netherlands, Spain) 
the value added function falls below the employment function but in Germany both seem to 
progress in tandem.  
The functions in Figure 2.3 reveal another interesting aspect. Although the functions 
for value added in constant prices are generally flatter than the functions in current 
prices, the slope of the former is still far away from zero. This indicates that an 
investigation of both the demand side and the supply side is required when studying 
the development of the service share and the determinants of service employment. 
How these actually relate to each other will be discussed in the following section 
where we lay out the mechanics of structural economic dynamics.  
21 Table 2.6    Coefficientw of correlation between actual and predicted service sector shares of employment, 
US and OECD Time series, and OECD cross-sections 
 
22 3 THE MECHANICS OF CHANGES IN ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE: DEMAND AND SUPPLY  
 
In general, the difference in the share of workers by industry in overall employment 
(between two countries, or between two points in time) will depend on both the demand 
and the supply side. Differences in income, the composition of final product demand and 
relative labor productivity11 will shape the distribution of employment across industries. 
Both sides of the market are interdependent but they may nevertheless follow a different 
logic. The expansion of supply is driven by technological progress and labor inputs, but 
whether additional supply meets additional demand depends on various variables such as 
income, income-elasticity of demand, prices, own as well as cross-price elasticities, 
demographics, preferences, etc. In the static demand and supply model, resources and 
everything else is given and prices equilibrate the two sides of the market. In a model of 
evolving markets, resources develop and demand and supply are interlinked. Rising prices 
may reduce upward demand trends but if these are driven by other variables such as income 
or demographics, demand for specific products may rise even with increasing prices. In this 
case rising prices may slow the expansion of an industry but they cannot prevent it. The 
economy will move to a new structure better serving the changed needs. The two sides of 
the market may equilibrate by quantity responses rather than price variations. Quantity 
response, however, may require labor mobility from the declining to the expanding 
industries (see e.g. Schettkat 1992, 1996)   
The structure of demand may be important to determine employment, but the level of 
demand is relevant as well. A core question, however, is whether the level depends on 
structure or whether the level determines structure. It may be that the possibilities for 
consumption (e.g. long shop opening hours, nice presentation of the products, etc.) affect 
the level of spending. Demand levels and structures may be endogenous if households 
outsource services traditionally produced within the household, which may create service 
jobs because households may buy services instead of self-provision, but also goods may 
substitute or support household production. Prepared food and frozen food are examples, 
but also durables such as dish-washers and washing machines to name just some equipment 
which may help to substitute household production time. The reverse causation may also be 
possible: household equipment may free household production time, which may then initiate 
                                                  
11   Labor productivity, of course, is not influenced by the efficiency of labor alone but depends on skills (human 
capital), physical capital and TFP. However, labor productivity and TFP seems to follow largely similar trends. 
‘… differences in labor productivity are not substantially explained by differences in capital intensity.’ (Bailey/ 
Solow 2001: 157).   
23 participation in market work (Tijdens, 1995). It is one of the key hypotheses of DEMPATEM 
that especially the expansion of service demand is caused by high female labor force 
participation and outsourcing of services formerly provided within households (see also 
Fuchs, 1980, Freeman/Schettkat, 2002). Decisions on long working hours and high labor 
force participation may then be endogenous.   
In the following, the determinants of industry employment shares are discussed in a 
somewhat formalized fashion. Relative demand and supply patterns will be described 
and equilibrium in a multi-sectoral economy will be discussed. Finally, the major 
hypotheses on structural change will be located in the developed demand-supply 
framework and predictions from these hypotheses for relative demand and 
productivity trends will be discussed.  
 
3.1 DETERMINANTS OF EMPLOYMENT SHARES  
Assuming for simplicity vertically integrated sectors, i.e. sectors which incorporate all stages 
of production so that demand in an industry directly affects output and employment in the 
particular industry (Pasinetti, 1983, Schettkat/Russo, 2001). This is a rough approximation, of 
course, but except for input-output data (the inter-industry division of labor is discussed in 
Gregory/Russo, 2003) this assumption need to be made and it simplifies the relations.  
 
Let   be demand (expenditures) in constant prices for product i and A labor productivity 
(Y/E)
12. That is that the capital stock used in production is implicitly included in the measure 
of labor productivity (A), which, of course, does not depend on the efficiency of workers 
alone (for an analysis of productivity taking labor skills and capital stock into account: 
Glyn/Salverda, 2003). Employment (E) in industry i is then given by:   
 
where   is real effective demand for product I in the vertically integrated industry i. 
The share of industry i in overall employment
13 will then be given by:   
                                                  
12   For simplicity, working hours are assumed to be constant or identical unless mentioned otherwise. 
13   Allowing for variations in working hours and expressing the industry share in working volume rather than in 
persons employed: 
 
where: WV  = working volume, h = average hours worked, A is labor productivity in output per person. For 
24  
That is that the employment share of industry i depends on two components: the share of 
that industry’s product in real final demand (α) and the inverse of the relative productivity of 
that industry to overall productivity   
Expenditures (effective demand) are the product of quantity and price (Y = q * p) and for 
comparisons over time within countries, but also for inter-country comparisons, one may 
want to take price changes and price levels into account to get the ‘real’ magnitudes. The 
quantity given expenditures can buy depends on the price. Therefore, changes in 
expenditure shares need to be corrected for price changes if one is interested in quantity 
changes.14 Similarly, in international comparisons the real share of product-specific 
expenditures in overall demand will depend on relative prices in the countries involved. If 
price trends for various items develop differently, changes in nominal shares will hide the 
actual quantities purchased. Taking price changes into account, the quantity share ( α) 
represented by expenditures in current prices will be:   
 
 
where q = quantity, P = price, i = subscript for items,  the price index, t = time  
superscript.  
That is that the relative quantity represented by a given ratio of nominal expenditures will 
depend on the inverse of the price trends for item i and the overall economy. Similarly for 
inter-country comparisons of relative quantities bought, nominal shares need to be adjusted 
for differences in price level.
15 However, the difficult question is, what quantity would 
                                                                                                                                         
a given working volume of industry i in overall working volume the employment share measured in persons 
will be   Thus, stark inter-industry differences in working hours may affect 
relative employment  substantially. 
14   Expenditures in current prices are, of course, relevant to evaluate spending behavior. 
15   The demand share in country c in prices of a reference country is 




 now represents the inverse of the price level in country c 
25 actually have been consumed at different prices. Is the quantity consumed of a certain good 
independent from the price or does quantity demanded depend on price? Whenever 
demand is price-elastic, changes in prices will affect the quantity bought, the inherent 
problem of price indices. The problem has been ‘solved’ by using either the quantities of the 
initial year (Laspeyre price index) or the quantities of the final year (Paasche price index).
16 
Because relative productivity entails the same ingredients
17 as the demand share equation 
but enters the employment share equation as inverse, the differences in price changes 
(relative levels, respectively) cancel out, when computing changes or differences in 
employment shares. Therefore, country differences in the employment share of an industry 
are real and not just an artifact of different relative prices in the mechanical sense 
discussed18. 
 
3.2 RELATIVE DEMAND PATTERNS  
Although differences in relative prices between countries affect both expenditures and 
productivity and are thus unimportant for employment shares, they nevertheless affect the 
quantities demanded in a country through the own price elasticity or cross-price elasticities 
(substitution effects). In general the level and structure of final demand depend on income, 
income distribution, prices and preferences, which may vary systematically between different 
household types (see DEMPATEM consumption project). However, the pattern of demand 
by major aggregates such as private consumption, public consumption, investment and net 
exports, will also affect the structure of demand because the share of services differs within 
these categories.   
Y• = C + Gi + Gc+  I  +  X  –  Q               ( 3 . 4 )   
Where Y• is effective aggregate demand, C is private household consumption (including non-
profit institutions serving private households), Gi is government spending on individual 
                                                                                                                                         
divided by the price level of the reference country (rc). 
16   Conventionally the weights were changed every 5 years, but in recent revisions of national accounting 
methods weights are changed annually in the so-called chain-linked method (see Tuke, A., 2003). 
17   Relative productivity for item i in country c but in prices of the reference country are: 
 
18     
where  the share of expenditures on item i in country c in prices of the reference country. 
26 consumption19, Gc is spending on collective consumption (Gi + Gc = conventional G), X is 
exports and Q is imports  
Since international trade is overwhelmingly in goods rather than in services, countries with 
an export surplus tend to have a larger share of its workforce in manufacturing industries 
and v.v. If private households spend their holidays in foreign countries, this is counted as 
imports of services from rest of the world (r.o.w.). Thus, foreign travel will reduce service 
expenditures in the domestic economy and if travel habits differ between countries, this may 
affect expenditure and employment patterns. However, it is net exports, which affect 
domestic employment and the ‘service import’ hypothesis turns out to be not overly 
important when net service imports are taken into account (see section 5.3).  
Overall effective demand in the domestic economy depends on domestically generated 
income plus transfers from r.o.w. (Y = Ydom + Yinflow). Of this income, the share is α 
directed to service demand and (1- α) to goods. Since trade is almost entirely in goods 
rather than in services (see section 5.4) and a net export deficit will lower the goods 
demand in the domestic economy and thus raise the share of service employment.   
Y = αY + (1 -α)Y  
and demand effective for domestic employment (Yd):  
Yd = αY + [(1 -α)Y - NX]  
where NX is net exports and is assumed to be goods only, which is a rough approximation 
to actual numbers (see section 5.3).  
The share of service employment will then be:   
 
Thus, a net export deficit raises relative service sector employment in the domestic 
economy and a surplus reduces it. Furthermore, if capital inflows or transfers from row raise 
a country’s income, expenditures will be higher than otherwise and they may even exceed 
domestic production.  
Private household consumption depends on disposable income and the average propensity 
to consume [C = c*Ydh where Ydh is disposable household income (Yd – (1-τ)), τ is the tax 
                                                  
19   In the 1993 System of National Accounts ‘individual consumption’ covers private household purchases in 
markets but also publicly provided but individually consumed items (United Nations Statistics Department, 
2003). The concept of ‘individual consumption’ has improved the international comparability and reveals 
surprising results (see section 5.2).   
27 rate, including contributions to social insurances]. Private household expenditures for a 
particular product may be described by:  
 
3
7 Where Ydh is disposable household income, Pi is the price of item i, Pi/Pj is a vector 
of cross prices (i ≠ j), D is a vector of demographic variables describing the structure 
of the households (see DEMPATEM consumption project) and ε is an error term.  
Changes in private household demand for product i are then the result of the changes in 
disposable income and the income elasticity of demand, changes in price and the own price 
elasticity, the sum of all substitution effects due to differential price trends, plus changes in 
the demographic structure (and probably in the income distribution, see consumption 
project of DEMAPATEM).  
Whether prices of other products are relevant for the decision to purchase a specific item 
depends on the utility function, i.e. whether and to what degree other products are 
substitutes.
20The elasticity of substitution between goods and services may be very limited 
or even zero as for example with educational services and cars. In other cases the 
substitutability may be very high, as for example in the case of laundry services and washing 
machines (see the interesting differences in ownership of washing machines in the US and 
Europe in the DEMAPATEM consumption papers). However, most important is the 
substitution of private services by public services, where the relative price (Pi/Pj) may be very 
high or even indefinite if services provided by the government are free. Thus, in countries 
with developed public services, private demand for these services is expected to be low or 
even non-existing. There will be a trade-off between public and private consumption 
concentrated in services,
  21
 but, of course, a large provision of public services affects 
disposable income, which will c.p. presumably be lower in countries with a developed public 
sector.  
                                                  
20   The underlying utility functions assumed explicitly or implicitly vary between analyses (see Appendix III). 
21   the share of private household expenditures in total consumer demand shows a clear trade-off to public 
services.  Share of private household expenditures in total consumption, 1995  
 
 US*   UK**   France   Germany   NL   Spain  
Agriculture   92.83   100.00   100.00   99.53   100.00   98.63  
Goods   84.32   100.00   96.88   99.27   91.71   96.08  
Services   81.20   66.82   58.51   59.40   55.06   68.20  
 
  Source: calculated from OECD input-output data *US; year=1997, ** UK: year=1998. 
  
  Thus, investigating private household demand only will be biased in the sense that countries with a low share 
of public services will have low private spending on services (see also section 5.3).   
28 Countries differ severely in the public-private dimension of service provision. Pension 
insurances, for example, may be publicly organized or they may be privately organized, they 
may be compulsory or voluntary. If private pension funds dominate, demand for and 
employment in the financial industries will be higher, compared to an otherwise similar 
publicly organized scheme where employment wil l  b e  i n  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  o r  g o v e r n m e n t  
services. Thus, the public/private provision of services is expected to affect the spending 
patterns of households severely. One way to handle this problem is to exclude the critical 
areas from the comparison, which will leave a ‘clean’ set of expenditures, supposedly 
unaffected by institutional arrangements (see e.g. Freeman/Schettkat 2002, DEMPATEM 
consumption papers). The ‘cleanliness’, however, comes at the price of selectivity and 
excluding information on important parts of individual consumption.22
 
3.3 RELATIVE SUPPLY PATTERNS, PRICES 
Potential supply expands either through technological improvements
23 (productivity) or 
through the expansion of inputs. Labor productivity depends (among others) on capital used, 
and for the sake of simplification we can use the following relation:  
 
where A = Y/E, i.e. labor productivity, and  
 24
where the • above the variables indicates the growth rate.   
If the growth of supply through technological improvements exceeds demand growth in a 
particular industry, workers must move away from that industry or working hours in that 
industry must be reduced. An alternative equilibrating mechanism, however, would be 
declining prices, which stimulate demand for the product of that industry but this requires 
demand to be sufficiently price-elastic. If demand growth leads supply growth opposite 
considerations apply.  
What are the relative prices? Assuming mark-up pricing with a uniform mark-up (µ>= 0) and 
ignoring capital costs, prices (P) in industry i will be given by:25
 
                                                  
22   The 1993 SNA distinguishes government consumption according to individual and collective consumption 
23   Technology includes organizational measures. 
24   Including working hours  , wgere h is average working hours.  the inter-country 
difference in the expansion of supply:   
25   Including non-wage labor costs: Pi = Ei wi (1 + τ+ µ) / Yi,r = wi (1 + τ+ µ) Ai
-1 where τ represents 
non-wage labor costs. Non-wage labor costs may for simplicity integrated into the markups. 
29   
 
Where: w is the wage rate, A is labor productivity (Yr / E), Yr is real output, E is employment 
and i is an industry subscript.  




Assuming constant mark-ups and constant relative non-wage labor costs, changes in relative 
prices can be approximated by:  
 
Thus, changes in relative prices and their changes depend on wage growth in industry i 
relative to the overall economy and the relative productivity growth in that industry. The 
difference in relative wage growth in service industries is the core of the argument that US 
service demand and employment is higher than in Europe. Downward flexible wages in the 
US allow for lower prices of industries lacking productivity growth and attract more demand 
(or loose less demand, respectively) and technologically stagnant service  industries can 
thus create more employment in the US than in Europe. Wage flexibility may reduce 
or compensate the price-rising effect of lacking productivity growth. In a well 
functioning labor market, however, wages should be independent of the industry and 
rise with similar rates everywhere (Baumol 1967, 2001). In other words, value added 
per worker
26 (per hour respectively) measured in current prices should equalize 
across the industries because wages should equalize (Baumol/ Wolff, 
1984, is the wage). Controlled for skills, permanently lower wages in 
service industries require imperfect labor markets. If one takes technology as 
exogenous, industries with productivity levels much lower than average productivity 
cannot exist with equal wages. Or if one regards productivity as endogenous, wage 
equality will diminish inter-industry productivity differentials in this case. Both 
                                                  
26    controlled for skills 
30 arguments have been made.
27 High wage differentiation in the US but low wage 
differentiation in Europe is the most popular explanation for the US-Europe service 
employment gap, but when comparing average industry wages in the US and 




but they may nevertheless qualitatively different 




3.4 THE WAY TO EQUILIBRIUM: LOCATING HYPOTHESES  
The major hypotheses to explain the rising shares of service sector employment can now be 
located in demand and supply space. For Clark (1951) and Fisher (1935) it was relative 
saturation for manufacturing products and a shift of demand to services, which was the main 
reason for expanding relative service employment.30 I.e. the demand share for services in 
constant prices (α) will be rising according to their hypothesis. Changes in productivity are 
regarded as relatively unimportant. Baumol (1967, 2001) challenged this view with a radical 
supply side hypothesis. He assumed the alphas (the share of service demand in overall 
demand) to be constant but the productivity ratio ( β = Ai / A•) to decline. Fuchs (1968, 
1980) confirmed that demand for services is relatively constant but he adds complexity in 
arguing that not only the level of income per capita but also the way a certain income level is 
achieved affects the structure of demand. A high degree of female labor force participation 
will necessarily reduce household production, which then may be substituted by market 
services and goods (Freeman/Schettkat 2002).   
Assuming constant employment population rates and constant working hours, income (per 
capita) depends on overall productivity growth. If services are technologically stagnant, the 
relative service-sector productivity (β) should depend on the advancement of the economy, 
which then depends entirely on productivity trends in the non-service part of the economy 
(say manufacturing). Therefore, given this assumption, relative service-sector productivity 
                                                  
27   For example, Herbert Giersch (1983) argued that wage equality in Europe force low productive 
services  
  (i.e. services with a low β -ratio) out of the market (technological unemployment of third degree as Giersch 
labeled it). For the impact of wages on productivity see Kleinknecht/Naastepad (2002). 
28   Non-wage labor costs may lift the wage costs in the low-paying industries more in Germany than in the US 
(see Freeman/Schettkat, 2002). 
29   Bailey and Solow argue that the compositions of services is different in Europe and the US. Relatively low 
wages allow marginal services to survive in the US but relatively high European wages extinguish theses 
service-jobs in Europe (Bailey/ Solow 2001).   
30   For a more comprehensive overview of theories of structural change see Schettkat/Yocarini, 2002. 
31 (β)  should be lower in the more advanced economies because high incomes in these 
economies are the result of rising productivity in the technologically progressive goods 
production. However, comparative inter-industry-productivity levels must remain a 
theoretical construction (Baumol/ Wolf 1984).    
If it is assumed that the rising income is spent in fixed real proportions on goods and 
services, employment in the technologically stagnant service industries will rise. Measured in 
current prices the employment and expenditures of service industries will expand. However, 
this is solely the effect of technological stagnancy in services and rising incomes caused by 
technological progress in goods production and not a shift of demand away from goods to 
services (in real terms), i.e. in Baumol’s analysis the αs are constant.  
Thus, the Baumol31 analysis suggests that the difference in service employment shares 
between the US and Europe results from higher per capita income in the US caused by a 
higher level of productivity in the US goods production. The advancement of goods 
production leads to higher productivity differential between services and the rest of the 
economy. Therefore, productivity in non-service industries is predicted in the Baumol 
framework to be higher in the US than in Europe. 
What may be the rational for constant αs? One possibility is that there is no substitution 
between goods and services, i.e. that it is a Leontief-type utility function. Another possibility 
is that positive income elasticity and negative price elasticity of service demand just 
compensate (Appelbaum/Schettkat, 2001).32 Obviously, the negative price elasticity of service 
demand is important and it may even overcompensate the income effect (Fuchs, 1980). As 
discussed above, the extent to which relative prices for services rise, depends on relative 
productivity growth but also on relative wage growth. Wage differentiation became the main 
explanation for differences in price levels between the US and Europe. Flexible and widely 
differentiated wages in the US, but rigid and narrow wages in Europe, so goes the story, 
                                                  
31   Baumol assumes αs to be constant and that changes in the employment share of services are entirely caused 
by rising productivity differentials between services and the rest of the economy. Productivity in non-service 
industries rises over time and thus the βs decline. 
   since by Baumol’s assumption   the RHS simplifies to 
the   with  because  but   the   may decline 
because the non-service part of the economy experiences rising productivity or because productivity in 
services actually declines. Since it is labor productivity, a different composition of the workforce in services,  a 
reduction of the capital stock etc. may cause the decline, see Glyn/ Salverda, 2003. The above formula also 
applies for inter-country differences since Baumol implicitly assumes constant αs in all countries (see section 
4.1) when referring to Summers’ (1985) analysis as cross-country support for the assumption of constant αs. 
32   A given nominal income would increase in real terms if one or more products fall in price. Hicks (1956) 
proposed to determine the substitution effect keeping utility constant, whereas Slutsky (1952) suggested to 
determine the substitution effect keeping real income constant. The observed change in demand in response 
to a price change is the combination of the income and the substitution effect.    
32 allowed for an expansion of low-skill, low-wage service industries in the US. Given similar 
technological conditions in these industries, this option was blocked in Europe by rigid 
wages, causing overly high prices for services. In a way, this hypothesis shares many aspects 
with Baumol’s model but relaxes Baumol’s assumption of competitive labor markets and 
assumes wages differentiated by industry productivity.   
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Baumol assumed income per capita to rise through technological progress. Actually, 
however, income levels (income per capita) are the outcome of the share of the population 
in employment (employment population rates), average working hours and labor 
productivity. Thus, the income level may change over time or may differ between two 
countries because these components change, most likely affecting also expenditure patterns. 
Why would  service demand expand if additional  income is generated through additional 
labor input? Here, relative productivity between market work and household production 
must be a key variable (Schettkat, 2002).  
The major hypotheses may be summarized as follows:  
α ↑   Clark/ Fisher  
β ↓   Baumol 
β ↓ and α ↑   Fuchs 
 
 
Which of theses hypotheses actually holds is an empirical question.33 Even if α turns out to 
be constant the question remains at which level that occurs at the aggregate economy, the 
                                                  
33    Many European economist argue that a declining relative service sector productivity (β ↓) should cured by 
rising w age differentials between service industries and the rest of the economy (ws/ w•↓). 
33 level of household expenditures, government consumption. In the following sections price 
levels and trends, demand and supply conditions (i.e., αs and βs) will be analyzed. 
34 4 PRICES  
 
4.1 PRICE LEVELS  
It is a commonly held belief that services are relatively cheaper in the US than in Europe and 
that they are consequently in higher demand there34. The EU-OECD project on purchasing-
power-parities reveals the opposite, however. Table 4.1 shows indices of the price level35 in 
selected European countries for GDP, total goods & services as well as private household 
consumption and a dozen subcomponents (see OECD, 2002) as a percentage of the GDP 
price level (upper panel) and of the US price level (lower panel). For the most recent 
benchmark year, 1999, the price level of GDP in the DEMPATEM countries is in the range of 
the US price level (row 21 in Table 4.1). Only Spain’s overall price level is significantly lower 
and Sweden’s is substantially higher than the US level. Prices for total goods is below the 
overall GDP-price level in the US and Sweden, but above in the other European countries, 
whereas the reverse holds for services. Relative to the US prices for total goods are about 
20 to 30 percent higher in Europe (except for Spain) than they are in the US, however, for 
total services the European price level is about 10 percent lower than in the US. In the 
Netherlands and Spain, service prices are even 20 and 30 percent under the US price level 
(compare table 4.1, upper panel). For consumer services the difference is less pronounced, 
but nevertheless it shows a similar pattern. In other words, one dollar buys more services 
but less goods in Europe. This seems to contradict the hypothesis that the US service sector 
is bigger than its European counterpart due to a more service-friendly price structure.36
                                                  
34   Baumol, however, implicitly assumes that the relative quantities of goods and services demanded are fixed, 
that is, that they are not substituted against each other according to changes in relative prices, or that price 
and income effects just balance. The latter is unlikely and therefore the Baumol argument must rely on a non-
substitutability Leontief-type utility function. 
35   The advantage of ‘price levels’ over PPPs here is that the latter gives the purchasing power of different 
currencies by eliminating the difference in price levels between countries. PPPs show the price of the ‘same’ 
product in national currencies over the price in another currency, e.g. ‘haircut in €/haircut in $’. Thus, PPPs 
are useful for price comparisons only if compared with the exchange rate or for comparisons between 
products. ‘Price levels’ can be compared directly. They are computed by dividing the PPP by the exchange rate 
and are thus without a dimension. (compare OECD 2002:12) 
36   The standard textbook model assuming substitutability and utility maximization suggests that the product with 
the higher price will be substituted by the product with the lower price (if we assume an homeothetic utility 
function on both sides of the Atlantic, services should be in higher demand in the country with the lower 
price level).   
35 Table 4.1: Comparative price levels, GDP = 100 
91  
 * individual cons. according to the 1993 SNA, i.e. including individual consumption provided by the public sector Source: 
Computations based on EKS 1999 PPPs (OECD, 2002).  
36 Investigating the price structure for individual consumer services (rows 8 to 20, 28-40 
respectively in table 4.1)37 reveals a more diverse picture. Price levels of some services in 
Europe, like health and education, are well below US price levels, while other services – 
especially those  traded in markets (like hotels, restaurants, recreational and cultural 
services)- have a markedly higher relative price in Europe. The most obvious difference 
occurs in restaurants and hotels, where prices in Europe are between 15 (in the 
Netherlands) and 168 percent (in Sweden) higher than in the US. Similarly, in recreational 
and cultural services, where one can expect prices to be largely determined by market 
forces, the price level in Europe is generally above that of the US. The same applies to 
miscellaneous goods and services. The only exception here is Spain.   
Health and education have substantially lower relative prices in Europe than in the US. Both 
these industries are characterized by a mix of public and private provisions and/or financing. 
For consistency reasons38 the price levels displayed for these industries are derived from 
‘total price’, which is the mean of the prices governments and private households have to 
pay for this service (see OECD, 2002: 16). The price levels displayed in Table 4.1 lead to the 
correct volumes when applied to the combined private and public expenditures for health 
and education. However, the lower price levels for these services in Europe are the result of 
the complex financing structures in these sectors; they are not an indicator of actual market 
prices. Nevertheless, government involvement in health and education, which is especially in 
health is stronger in Europe than in the US (see section 5.2), does seem to reduce the price 
level in these industries.  
Assuming substitutability between goods and services and identical, homeothetic indifference 
curves in the countries, consumers in the country with the lowest relative service prices 
should put a higher share of their budget into services and vice versa (as illustrated in Fig. 
4.1). In the country with higher services prices (cg) the budget curve is flatter and thus the 
share of income spent on services should be lower. Assuming homeothetic indifference 
curves, the income levels should not affect the distribution of expenditures between services 
and goods. Against the common view, the US relative prices in services are not generally 
                                                  
37   Prices in table 4.1 are derived from PPPs aggregated with the EKS method (EKS stands for Eltetö-Köves-Szulc) 
which calculates in the first step a set of binary PPPs between each pair of countries. These bilateral PPPs are 
then made transitive. EKS indices are considered to be better suited for comparisons of prices and volumes of 
individual aggregates across countries whereas GK PPPs (which use weights, GK stands for Geary-Kahmis) are 
regarded as suited for volume and price structure comparison (compare OECD 2002 page 165 and see 
below) 
38   Here ‘consistency’ refers to the fact that that expenditures are equivalent to the product of price and volume. 
37 lower than in Europe, although some services are. For relative prices to strongly affect the 
expenditure structure, a high price elasticity of demand must be assumed. The volume 
structure should correlate highly with the price structure, which is investigated in the 
following section.  
Figure 4.1: The impact of relative prices on demand structure in a model with substitutability between 
goods and services 
    service
 
good G 











4.2 PRICE AND VOLUME SIMILARITIES  
Table 4.2 displays correlation coefficients for the price and volume structure of actual 
private household consumption and GDP based on ‘GK-PPPs’ 39 in the DEMPATEM 
countries and Sweden. The coefficients for the price structure are quite high and higher than 
those for the volume structure of both GDP and private household consumption. It also 
seems to be the case that, with the exception of Spain, price and volume structure 
correlations are higher between the European countries than between the U.S. and any 
European country for both GDP and household consumption. Spain correlates low with 
both the US and the other European countries with respect to the volume structure. These 
correlations may be taken as a hint that volume structure of household consumption and of 
GDP are influenced by other variables besides relative prices. In particular income effects 
and preferences seem to be important factors to explain the differences in consumption 
patterns between countries.  
                                                  
39   GK stands for Geary/Khamis. 
38 Table 4.2: Inter-country correlation coefficients for private household consumption and GDP US 
Actual individual consumption of private households Volume 
Similarities  
  UK   FR   GER   NL   ES   SW  
US   1.000   0.752   0.805   0.805   0.823   0.676   0.723  
UK     1.000   0.869   0.903   0.898   0.756   0.877  
FR      1.000   0.874   0.920   0.823   0.917  
GER        1.000   0.916   0.690   0.878  
NL          1.000   0.751   0.887  
ES            1.000   0.678  
SW              1.000  
       Prices      
  US   UK   FR   GER   NL   ES   SW  
US   1.000   0.861   0.807   0.910   0.871   0.888   0.836  
UK     1.000   0.956   0.949   0.961   0.948   0.932  
FR      1.000   0.973   0.965   0.964   0.928  
GER        1.000   0.968   0.949   0.888  
NL          1.000   0.964   0.900  
ES            1.000   0.918  
SW              1.000   
      
GDP  
   
     Volume similari  ties     
  US   UK   FR   GER   NL   ES   SW  
US   1.000   0.737   0.709   0.768   0.651   0.672   0.497  
UK     1.000   0.782   0.844   0.722   0.711   0.650  
FR      1.000   0.828   0.863   0.776   0.842  
GER        1.000   0.848   0.665   0.767  
NL          1.000   0.635   0.876  
ES            1.000   0.512  
SW              1.000  
       Prices      
  US   UK   FR   GER   NL   ES   SW  
US   1.000   0.878   0.886   0.914   0.882   0.885   0.838  
UK     1.000   0.954   0.953   0.961   0.947   0.923  
FR      1.000   0.971   0.971   0.961   0.910  
GER        1.000   0.970   0.948   0.896  
NL          1.000   0.961   0.909  
ES            1.000   0.917  
SW              1.000   
Source: OECD 2002: Tables A5-A8, pp. 188-204.  
 
4.3 PRICE TRENDS  
How did prices in various categories of private household consumption develop over time? 
Did service prices rise faster than those in the rest of the economy? In other words, do 
services show the expected effects of the cost disease? Table 4.3 displays the difference 
between the price trends of individual expenditure categories and the price trend of final 
39 private consumption.40 Price trends are derived from private household expenditures in 
current and constant prices as published in the OECD National Accounts Statistics. This 
means that price deflators are implicit, i.e. they are not derived from observed price trends 
of individual items, but instead they include quantity reactions of demand to the changing 
price structure. One expects quantity demanded to be price elastic and therefore demand 
for items with above-average price increases to diminish, because these items are 
substituted by others, or because of an ‘own-price elasticity’. If demand is price-elastic and 
relative prices rise, the quantity actually bought in t+1 would be less than the quantity, which 
would have been bought with unchanged prices (or if the price elasticity had been zero). 
Thus, the comparison between current and constant price expenditures represents a mixed 
effect of changes in income, preferences and actual changes in prices. For this reason, implicit 
price deflators underestimate the true price trends in case of rising prices and overestimate 
them in case of falling prices.  
To compare between countries, Table 4.3 also shows the trend in the implicit price deflator 
for the individual expenditures as a difference from overall final consumption. Price trends 
for total services are significantly higher than for goods as the data reveals. From 1980 
onward, the prices for goods rose by 2.7%-points annually (averaged but unweighted over all 
countries). Prices for services grew by about 0.5%-points or more. In all countries, prices for 
services consumed by private households rose more than overall final consumption and 
consequently relative goods-prices were declining in all countries (see lower row in table 
4.3).  
Relative prices for housing were usually rising. In some service categories (like recreation, 
which includes education) price trends were below the average. Relative prices of 
miscellaneous goods and services rose almost everywhere, but for health a split occurs. The 
US, UK and France face rising relative prices, but in the other countries these are declining. 
However, one has to keep in mind that these categories do not exclusively cover services 
but that they also cover some goods and that ‘goods’ also includes distributional services. 
That is surely true for the category ‘medical services’, for example, which covers not only 
expenditures on services but also on goods. Restaurants & hotels are clearly seen as a 
service but, of course, they contain a substantial amount of goods. All services and all goods 
are composite products but to different degrees as discussed in section 1.2.  
                                                  
40   Price trends were computed as trends of the implicit price deflator as derived from the ratio of current over 
constant prices. The time series were taken from the OECD National Accounts volume II. The categories for 
the 1990s onwards (in some countries from the beginning of the 1990s, in other countries a bit later)  follow 
the 1993 SNA classification, which is not strictly comparable with the earlier data. The major categories used 
here, however, fit quite well. 
40 Table 4.3: Implicit price trends in individual categories of private household consumption, deviation from 
overall price trend of final consumption, in %-points, 1980+.  
 
Source: Computations based on OECD National Accounts (OECD, 2000)  
 
 
4.4 SERVICE SHARES IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PRICES  
In current prices the service share in demand and output is predicted to rise according to 
the ‘hierarchy of needs’ hypothesis of Clark and Fisher as well as according to Baumol’s ‘cost 
disease’ hypothesis. Both hypotheses, however, can differ with respect to service share in 
output and demand at constant prices. This section investigates these trends in  
53 both current and constant prices. First a reanalysis of Robert Summers’ earlier work, in 
which he argued that in constant prices41 the service share on GDP is constant with respect 
to income per capita.  The section continues with an analysis of services in final demand and 
in the major final demand categories in real figures. Then the public-private division of 
consumption is analyzed. Services as they appear in different data sources will be discussed 
and finally the major components in the change of relative service demand are presented.  
William Baumol (e.g., 2001) supported his assumption that the service share in real GDP 
does not rise with income per capita but rather remains constant with Robert Summers’ 
analysis of the Penn-World-Tables (1985). Summers found that the share of services in 
nominal GDP (national currency and prices) increases with per-capita income but that the 
service share in real GDP (international prices) is constant over a wide range of per-capita 
incomes in a cross-section. I.e. Summers must have assumed that all countries had the same 
share of services in GDP. This is stronger than the original Baumol hypothesis, which only 
assumes constant service shares in GDP with rising income within a country but not 
                                                  
41   It is common to label ‘international prices’ as ‘real’ because expenditures in different countries are expressed 
in ‘common prices levels’. “They are therefore the spatial equivalent of a time series of GDP for single country 
expressed in constant prices” (OECD 2002:11). 
41 necessarily identical service share in different countries. Table 4.4 displays regressions of the 
service-share on relative per-capita income (relative to the US) as published in the Penn-
World-Tables. Without doubt, the significant coefficient of income in the regressions of the 
share of services in nominal GDP (GDP measured in national current prices) on income per 
capita disappears or becomes even negative when regressing the share of services in real 
GDP (based on international prices) on income per capita. This confirms the evidence from 
the Summers’ analysis as cited by William Baumol (2001, Figure 2.1)42
However, transforming national into international prices, mainly lifts the service shares in 
countries with relatively low-income levels (Figures 4.2, 4.3) and although the positive slope 
between income and expenditures on services disappears, the variation remains (Table 4.5), 
which is not expected if international differences in the share of services are due to price 
effects only. Raising the service shares of low-income countries led the relation of services 
and income to become negative. Why would low-income countries spend such a high share 
of their income on services? It is hard to argue that low prices for services and income 
inequality in these countries are not part of the story. The question then is, however, 
whether services bought at very low prices in low-income countries would also be bought at 
‘international prices’  (i.e., whether assuming a price elasticity of zero for service demand is a 
reliable assumption, see Appelbaum/Schettkat, 1999).
43
If demand is negatively price-elastic the quantity demanded will be reduced with rising prices. 
This effect is ignored if expenditures are valued with international prices as in the Penn-
World-Tables. In other words, the share of services in real (international price) GDP will be 
severely overestimated in countries where prices are substantially lower than in the 
reference country. This is the so-called Gerschenkron effect or price effect. The functions in 
Figure 2.3 suggested that the service share in value-added rises with income per capita and 
also analysis for recent OECD data (2002) indicates are positive relation between the two 
variables among the core OECD countries.
44 Therefore, we investigate trends in services in 
nominal and real GDP within countries in Section 5.  
  
                                                  
42   A general criticism may be that income and productivity estimates for levels are very divers. For example 
Madison (1996) estimates West-Germany’s income per capita at 90% of the US income level for 1992. The 
BLS (2000) estimate for the same year is 84.7%. Also BLS estimates seems to differ from Penn-World-Tables 
estimates. The PPP aggregation method EKS (Eleto-Köves-Szulc, i.e. countries equally weighted) versus GK 
(Geary-Khamis, i.e. countries weighted according to GDP) can produce deviations of 5% (BLS 2000: 15/16),  
which vary between countries. 
43   Falvey and Gemmel (1996) conclude that the price effects is stronger than the income effect and conclude on 
the basis of the 1990 version of the Penn-World-Tables that the service share declines with income per 
capita. However, this analysis is again based on cross-section data. 
44   Including East-European countries changes the pictures because these countries still have a very big public 





43 Table 4.4 Regressions of the share of service expenditures in GDP in national and international prices on 
the relative income position, cross-country, various countries  
 
Note: Incl. Rent: Rents are counted as services; Excl. Rent: rents are excluded from services Source: Computations based on Penn 
World Tables, for a list of the included see the Penn World Tables (Heston, A., Summers, R. and Aten, B., 2002). Incl. Rent = 
including rent as service expenditures Excl Rent = excluding rent from service expenditures  
 
Table 4.5 Coefficients of cross-country variation of service shares measured in national and in 
international prices 
 
Source: Computations are based on Penn-World-Tables  
44 4.5 CONCLUSIONS  
-  US relative prices are generally lower for goods, but higher for services compared to 
European price levels. Aggregate services in 1999 show a lower price level in Europe than in 
the US, but this does not hold for 'private services' (such as restaurants/hotels) where price 
levels in Europe are substantially above the US price levels.  
-  Lower relative prices for overall services seem to be caused by the impact of publicly 
provided services, which are especially important in health and education.  
-  Since volume similarities are lower than price similarities for private household 
consumption and GDP, other variables than just the price structure seem to severely 
influence the structure of demand.  
-  When analyzing price trends it becomes clear that some services seem to continuously 
suffer from the cost disease but that others do not. Even for health services some countries 
show declining relative prices.   
-  Overall price trends were very different between countries but have converged in the 
1990s.  
-  There is a positive relation between service shares in GDP and relative income in cross-
country analysis when measured in national prices.  
-  There is no (or even a negative) relation between the service share in GDP and relative 
income in a broad group of divers countries when measured in international prices. But 
there is a positive relation of the service share measured in international prices among the 
OECD countries.   
-  The cross-country variation of service shares is roughly similar whether the shares are 
measured in national or in international prices and the question remains why countries have 
different shares in services  
-  Cross-country analysis may hide developments within countries.  
45 46 5 ALPHAS: THE SHARE OF SERVICES IN NOMINAL AND 
REAL EXPENDITURES WITHIN COUNTRIES  
 
5.1 DEMAND IN VARIOUS DATA SOURCES  
Several data sources provide information on demand in the economy. First, National Income 
and Product Account data (NIPA) provides the most accurate and consistent information on 
the main aggregates such as household consumption, government consumption, investment 
etc. In addition, NIPA data breaks down household consumption expenditure into various 
categories such as food, housing, personal services etc. Information on services as well as 
international comparability improved over time, but for time series many compromises still 
need to be made. The 1993 SNA (System of National Accounts) splits public consumption 
into a part representing individual consumption, for example health services, and another 
part representing true public consumption and thus provides data on ‘true’ individual and 
collective consumption respectively (UN Statistical Division, 2003).  
Second, input-output data also provides information on the final demand categories within 
the major aggregates (private household consumption, government consumption, 
investment, imports, exports). The specific advantage of input-output data is that 
distributional services occur as a separate demand category. In other data (NIPA or 
expenditure surveys), expenses for distributional services are part of the products 
purchased. The richest information on private consumption is provided by consumer 
surveys, which give a detailed insight into the expenditure patterns of private households and 
usually allow for the control of various household characteristics. For the purpose of the 
current paper input-output and NIPA data are used. Consumer surveys are the basis for the 
detailed analysis in DEMPATEM’s consumption project.  
 
Table 5.1 Demand in different data sources  
National Accounts  Input-output   Expenditure Surveys  
Value added of  Household expenditures by  Household demand by  Household expenditures 
industries product  product  by  product 
Information gathered from various data sources. Most  Roughly consistent with  Survey data 
reliable data on the aggregate economy  NIPA data   
No distinction by user    User specific   
  SNA 93 includes publicly 
provided but individually 
consumed item in individual 
consumption 
Distributional services 
are separated. Trade 
services identified 
Distributional services are 
not separated. Trade 
services are not identified 
 
47 5.2 THE SHARE OF SERVICES IN NOMINAL AND IN REAL FINAL 
DEMAND WITHIN COUNTRIES  
Table 5.2 shows the development of the sector shares in final demand derived from the 
OECD Input-Output databases. Input-output data show trading services as a separate 
category of final demand (for definitions see Appendix 2). The purchase price of a good is 
split into a component representing the actual good and another representing the 
distributional service. This is a major difference to expenditure data as published in the 
National Accounts or in expenditure surveys because in these data the service component is 
not separated but included in the expenditure for the good.45 Final domestic demand data 
show rising service shares up to 1990 for all DEMPATEM countries except Germany and the 
Netherlands (1986). These trends occur in current price (nominal) as well as in constant 
price (Table 5.2). The data for the mid 1990s (although not fully comparable to the earlier 
years) shows a continuation of these trends. Roughly speaking, the distance of the European 
countries with respect to the service-sector share in final demand to the US remained at 
about 10%-points in the UK, France, and the Netherlands, but higher in Germany.   
The causes for these differences in service shares of final demand may be related to different 
compositions of final demand. Exports, for example, consist mainly of manufactured goods 
and a high share of exports in final demand will thus reduce the service share in overall final 
demand. By far the most important demand component for services is private consumption, 
followed by public consumption, which together amount to 80 to 94 percent of final demand 
for services (Table 5.3). Domestic consumption is also the most important final demand 
category for manufacturing, although in this sector it is much less dominant than for services. 
Therefore rising domestic demand will first of all benefit the service industries. The different 
final demand components have rather different weights in overall final demand in the various 
countries though.  
Looking at this issue from another perspective and asking what share the three broad 
sectors have within the final demand categories (Table 5.4) shows the dominance of services 
in the consumption categories (public and private). Especially in private household demand 
the service share rose substantially over time. The average US households spend three 
quarter of its overall expenditures on services. This share is generally lower in the European 
countries but is nevertheless still reaching 60%. The rise of the service share was, of course, 
at the expense of the relative demand for goods.   
 
                                                  
45   Of course, the distributional service part is related to the purchase of a good. Trade is not a ‘stand alone’ 
service (see Glyn/ Salverda, 2003). 
48 Table 5.2 The share of agriculture, manufacturing, and services in final domestic demand, current and 
constant prices, OECD Input-Output data  
Constant prices   Current prices  
Agric.   Manuf.   Serv.   Agric.   Manuf.   Serv.  
US   1972   1.5   47.1   51.4   1.4   43.4   55.2  
   1977   1.9   44.1   54.0   1.8   43.2   55.0  
   1985   2.1   44.0   54.0   1.6   40.4   58.1  
   1990   1.9   42.5   55.6   1.4   37.7   60.9  
   1997         1.2   34.9   63.0  
UK   1968   3.4   56.3   40.3   3.6   53.0   43.4  
   1979   3.2   53.8   42.9   3.3   52.6   44.2  
   1984   4.2   48.6   47.1   4.8   47.0   48.2  
   1990   3.4   52.0   44.7   2.5   47.1   50.4  
   1995         1.6   40.4   57.9  
FR   1972   3.4   54.1   42.5   4.7   61.5   33.8  
   1977   2.9   53.7   43.5   3.3   53.9   42.8  
   1985   3.7   49.8   46.5   3.5   49.3   47.2  
   1990   3.3   51.6   45.1   2.9   48.9   48.2  
   1995         1.6   44.7   53.7  
GER   1972 
         
   1978   1.8   57.1   41.0   1.8   56.7   41.4  
   1986   1.3   56.7   41.6   1.2   55.5   42.8  
   1990   1.4   57.9   40.5   1.3   56.8   41.8  
   1995         1.4   47.2   51.4  
NL   1972   3.6   53.1   43.2   3.4   55.0   41.5  
   1977   4.5   52.6   43.1   4.5   52.1   43.6  
   1986   4.3   52.6   43.0   4.6   51.5   44.1  
   1990           
   1995         3.8   47.9   48.0  
ES   1972 
         
   1977           
   1986        3.5   45.9   50.6  
   1990        1.9   42.2   55.9  
   1995         2.5   42.8   54.7  
Source: computations are based on the OECD Input-Output databases, the data for the mid 1990s are not fully comparable 
with those of the earlier periods base year for constant prices: USA 1982, UK 1980, Germany 1985, France 1980, NL 1980, 
Germany 1995 is united Germany.  
 
49 Table 5.3 The weight of demand components in overall final demand (current prices) 
 
Final   Consumption   Investment   Changes in   Exports Imports  
Year   Demand      Stocks   
     Overall   Private   Public         
US   1997 Overall   100.0   72.8   59.6   13.2   17.9   0.5   8.8   9.5  
  Agric.   100.0   38.6   35.9   2.8   26.9   3.5   31.0   79.0  
  Manuf.   100.0   43.2   36.4   6.8   39.3   1.2   16.3   24.0  
  Serv.   100.0   89.8   72.9   16.9   5.9   0.1   4.2   0.1  
UK   1995 Overall   100.0   65.1   50.9   14.3   13.6   0.4   20.8   21.5  
  Agric.   100.0   42.3   42.3   0.0   7.6   0.2   49.9   66.8  
  Manuf.   100.0   38.6   38.6   0.0   28.1   0.9   32.4   41.4  
  Serv.   100.0   84.3   59.7   24.6   3.7   0.1   11.8   6.4  
FR   1995 Overall   100.0   66.7   46.8   19.9   15.6   0.3   17.3   16.7  
  Agric.   100.0   58.3   58.3   0.0   5.1   2.2   34.3   82.2  
  Manuf.   100.0   40.3   39.1   1.3   28.0   0.6   31.0   31.0  
  Serv.   100.0   88.9   52.9   36.0   5.7   0.0   5.3   2.9  
GER    1995 Overall  100.0   61.0   43.6   17.4   18.3   0.2   20.6   18.8  
Agric.   100.0   65.3   65.1   0.2   12.3   0.8   21.6   122.8  
Manuf.   100.0   29.7   29.6   0.1   33.2   0.4   36.7   31.9  
Serv.   100.0   89.5   55.8   33.7   4.8   0.0   5.7   3.9  
NL   1995 Overall   100.0   45.8   29.3   17.0   13.1   0.5   40.6   34.5  
  Agric.   100.0   9.1   9.1   0.0   4.6   -0.2   86.5   91.6  
  Manuf.   100.0   17.8   16.4   1.5   21.1   1.1   60.0   55.8  
  Serv.   100.0   76.0   42.6   33.4   5.9   0.0   18.0   9.2  
ES   1995 Overall   100.0   65.7   50.1   15.6   18.0   0.3   16.0   19.2  
  Agric.   100.0   51.3   50.7   0.7   4.0   1.0   43.6   98.0  
  Manuf.   100.0   36.2   34.8   1.4   35.3   0.6   27.9   34.5  
  Serv.   100.0   89.4   62.1   27.3   5.2   0.0   5.3   3.6  
Source: computations are based on the OECD’s Input-Output database 
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Year   Demand      Stocks   
     Overall   Private   Public         
US   1997 Agric.   1.2   0.6   0.7   0.3   1.8   7.7   4.3   10.1  
  Manuf.   35.1   20.8   21.4   18.1   77.2   77.1   65.3   89.1  
  Serv.   63.7   78.5   77.8   81.7   21.0   15.2   30.5   0.8  
UK   1995 Agric.   1.6   1.1   1.4   0.0   0.9   0.9   3.9   5.1  
  Manuf.   40.4   24.0   30.7   0.0   83.2   84.8   63.1   77.8  
  Serv.   57.9   75.0   67.9   100.0   15.9   14.3   33.0   17.1  
F
R   1995 Agric.   1.6   1.4   2.0   0.0   0.5   11.5   3.2   7.9  
  Manuf.   44.7   27.0   37.3   2.8   79.8   83.1   80.2   82.8  
  Serv.   53.7   71.6   60.7   97.2   19.6   5.3   16.6   9.3  
GER      1995 
Agric.   1.4   1.5   2.1   0.0   0.9   5.9   1.4   9.0  
  Manuf.   47.2   23.0   32.1   0.4   85.7   93.8   84.2   80.3  
  Serv.   51.4   75.5   65.9   99.6   13.4   0.3   14.3   10.8  
N
L   1995 Agric.   3.9   0.8   1.2   0.0   1.3   -1.4   8.2   10.2  
  Manuf.   47.4   18.5   26.9   4.1   76.5   99.0   70.1   76.8  
  Serv.   48.7   80.8   71.9   95.9   22.1   2.5   21.7   12.9  
E
S   1995 Agric.   2.5   2.0   2.5   0.1   0.6   8.8   6.8   12.8  
  Manuf.   42.8   23.6   29.7   3.9   83.7   90.6   74.9   77.0  
  Serv.   54.7   74.5   67.8   96.0   15.8   0.7   18.3   10.2  
Source: computations are based on the OECD’s Input-Output database  
 
5.3 THE COMPOSITION OF CONSUMPTION, PUBLIC - PRIVATE  
Final consumption is usually typified by the buyer of the product. If a private household 
purchases a product it is classified as private household consumption. If the government buys 
or provides the exact same product, it is classified as government or public consumption. 
Therefore private household expenditures are strongly influenced by institutional 
arrangements, which differ substantially between countries. There may be efficiency reasons 
or distributional concerns in the decision to provide a product publicly or privately but in 
principle ‘health services’, for example, can be provided on a private market basis, publicly or 
as a mix of the two. Similarly, pension insurance may be organized by the government or by 
private companies. To take these differences into account, the 1993 System of National 
Accounts (SNA) distinguishes government consumption into a part that can be regarded as 
individual consumption and another part that is ‘pure’ collective consumption. Adding private 
household expenditures (including expenditures of nonprofit institutions serving households) 
and individual consumption expenditures made by the government gives actual individual 
consumption expenditures.  
51 All European countries except the UK consume a lower share of their GDP than the US. In 
national currencies the consumption gap is usually around 5%-points, but 9%-points in the 
Netherlands (row 8 in Table 5.5). These differences are to a large part caused by positive 
net exports in these countries compared to a trade deficit in the US (see Table 5.3). 
Analyzing the components of final consumption, one sees a stark contrast in the public-
private pattern between the US and a typical continental European country (not so much 
between the US and the UK and Spain). Table 5.5 includes Sweden as an example of a 
country with a very high individual” component in government consumption. In Europe 
government consumption is typically between 25 and 35% of final consumption (row 3 of 
Table 5.5) but in the US this is only 17%. However, the split of government consumption 
into collective and individual consumption corrects this pattern: in Europe about 60% of 
government consumption is individual and only 40% is collective whereas in the US this is 
exactly the opposite (row 4 and 5 of Table 5.5). Thus, in Europe the public sector seems to 
be  an important provider of individual consumption items, which are provided privately in 
the US (see also Freeman/Rein, 1988).    
How big is the collective sector in terms of overall final consumption? Taking the split of 
government consumption into ‘individual’ and ‘collective’ at face value, the share of collective 
consumption in overall final consumption reveals a surprising result: except for the 
Netherlands, all countries spend about 10% of overall final consumption on collective 
consumption (row 6 in Table 5.5). The US looks like a typical European state with respect to 
collective consumption similar to Sweden! However, considering that Sweden consumes 
only 77% of its GDP but the US 82%, leaves Sweden with 7.6% collective consumption in 
GDP compared to 8.7% in the US.   
As discussed in section 3, expenditure shares are influenced by the price structure in the 
economy. Therefore, rows 9-16 in Table 5.5 also display the consumption patterns in 
international prices based on EKS PPPs. In international prices the final consumption share in 
GDP (row 16) is generally higher than in national prices in the European countries, but 
lower in the US. In international (real) prices the share of private household consumption in 
final consumption is about 4%-points higher in the US than in national prices. The pattern 
within the countries and the differences between remain, although there are slight changes 
(see Table 5.5 lower panel).  
 
52 Table 5.5  The composition of final consumption, private versus public  
  
 
Source: OECD 2002  
 
Table 5.6 shows that government expenditure is almost entirely concentrated in service 
industries and in a few service industries only (the US and the Netherlands show some 
public engagement in industry as well). Besides public administration, the government is 
engaged in ‘research and development, ‘education’ and ‘health’. In a European state, at least 
75% of the final demand in education is government demand and in many cases it is well 
above 90%. In the US, the negative government share in education and health is a statistical 
artifact because all value added of the public sector is booked in ‘public administration’. The 
negative numbers reflect purchases of the public sector, for example private payments for 
meals served in school, which would otherwise be counted twice (as expenditures of private 
53 households and as public consumption). Given that most schools are public and free of 
charge in the US (see Schmitt, 2003) the US figures then simply reflect the US NIPA system.
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The health sector is a bit more diverse, illustrating the differences in the organizational 
structure between countries. In Germany, for example, health insurance is compulsory for 
most employees. Almost everybody is covered by a health insurance, but about three 
quarters of health expenditures are classified as private because insurances and service 
providers are mostly private organizations.
47 In other countries, like France, the Netherlands 
and the UK health services are organized through public funds or are provided publicly 
resulting in a government share of three quarters in health services.   
Thus, a major difference between the US and the European countries is the degree to which 
individual consumption is provided through the public sector. Government consumption is 
higher in Europe because governments provide individual services, not because ‘true’ 
collective consumption is higher in Europe. For collective consumption the US looks like a 
typical European country.  
Table 5.6 The Share of Private Households, Non-Profit Institutions & Govrnments in Final Demand,1995. 
US      UK      FR  
Private   Non-  Govern-  Private   Non-  Govern-  Private   Non-  Govern- 
HH   Profit   ment   HH   Profit   ment   HH   Profit   ment  
Agriculture   92.8   0.0   7.2   100.0   0.0   0.0   100.0   0.0   0.0  
Industry   84.3   0.0   15.7   100.0   0.0   0.0   96.9   0.0   3.1  
Services   81.2   0.0   18.8   66.8   4.0   29.2   58.5   1.0   40.5  
In detailed services:  
              
Wholesale and Retail 
trade, Repairs   97.7   0.0   2.3   100.0   0.0   0.0   95.4   0.0   4.6  
Hotels, Restaurants   100.1   0.0   -0.1   100.0   0.0   0.0   100.0   0.0   0.0  
Transport, Storage   85.7   0.0   14.3   100.0   0.0   0.0   97.9   0.0   2.1  
Post, Communication   86.1   0.0   13.9   100.0   0.0   0.0   100.0   0.0   0.0  
Finance, Insurance   96.0   0.0   4.0   99.5   0.5   0.0   100.0   0.0   0.0  
Real Estate Activities   97.9   0.0   2.1   100.0   0.0   0.0   92.2   0.0   7.8  
Computer & related 
act.   32.3   0.0   67.7   .   .   .   100.0   0.0   0.0  
R&D   1.1   0.0   98.9   0.0   100.0   0.0   0.2   0.0   99.8  
Other business 
activities   73.4   0.0   26.6   92.3   7.7   0.0   100.0   0.0   0.0  
Public Administration, 
Defense, Soc.Sec   0.0   0.0   100.0   5.4   0.0   94.6   0.1   0.0   99.9  
Education   127.4   0.0   -27.4   16.0   29.5   54.5   8.6   0.0   91.4  
Health and Social 
Work   110.5   0.0   -10.5   14.5   3.7   81.7   23.6   0.6   75.8  
Other Services   100.1   0.0   -0.1   77.6   9.6   12.7   73.0   14.1   12.9  
                                                  
46   Nadim Ahmad from OECD kindly clarified this and other input-output issues to us. 
47   It is a major difference between NIPA and household budget surveys that the former includes employers’ 
contributions to health and pension insurance whereas it is excluded private consumption in the latter (see 
Hertel/ Statistisches Bundesamt) 1997).   








Private   Non-  Govern-  Private   Non-  Govern-  Private   Non-  Govern- 
  HH   Profit   ment   HH   Profit   ment   HH   Profit   ment  
Agriculture   99.5   0.1   0.1   100.0   0.0   0.0   98.6   0.0   1.3  
Industry   99.3   0.2   0.5   91.7   0.0   8.3   96.1   0.0   3.9  
Services   59.4   3.0   37.6   55.1   1.0   43.9   68.2   1.3   30.5  
In detailed services:  
              
Wholesale and Retail 
trade, Repairs   100.0   0.0   0.0   95.5   0.0   4.5   96.4   0.0   3.6  
Hotels, Restaurants   100.0   0.0   0.0   98.7   0.0   1.3   99.7   0.0   0.3  
Transport, Storage   94.1   0.0   5.9   77.0   0.0   23.0   95.8   0.0   4.2  
Post, Communication   100.0   0.0   0.0   100.0   0.0   0.0   99.3   0.0   0.7  
Finance, Insurance   100.0   0.0   0.0   98.7   0.0   1.3   100.0   0.0   0.0  
Real Estate Activities   100.0   0.0   0.0   95.4   0.0   4.6   100.0   0.0   0.0  
Computer & related 
act.   100.0   0.0   0.0   100.0   0.0   0.0   86.9   0.0   13.1  
R&D   0.1   27.5   72.4   0.0   0.0   100.0   0.1   0.0   99.1  
Other business 
activities   98.9   0.3   0.8   58.6   0.0   41.4   93.3   0.1   6.6  
Public Administration, 
Defense, Soc.Sec   1.2   0.0   98.8   6.0   0.0   94.0   2.6   0.0   97.4  
Education   10.9   9.1   80.0   3.4   0.0   96.6   23.5   0.0   76.5  
Health and Social 
Work   73.3   18.5   8.2   25.1   0.1   74.8   26.5   8.6   64.9  
Other Services   70.0   15.6   14.5   62.7   18.0   19.4   78.0   3.4   18.5  
 
Source: computation based on the OECD input output database, tables for total demand. US figures refer to 1997  
 
5.4 IMPORT OF SERVICES  
Smaller countries usually have higher shares of imports but also of exports, i.e. they are 
more open. Smallness of European countries, it is frequently argued, lowers the 
expenditures on typical private services consumed during vacation, such as hotel services, 
restaurant meals, etc. Furthermore, especially North-Europeans spend their holidays in the 
South and thus reduce service expenditures in their home countries. In terms of national 
accounting they import services and thus raise demand and employment in service industries 
in the countries of their travel destinations.48 Since the US is much bigger, most of the 
vacation expenditures remain within the country and this positively affects service 
employment.  
Using the import matrix and the total expenditure matrix from the OECD input-output 
database, the service import hypothesis can be evaluated. Table 5.7 displays the shares of 
imports in total household expenditures for agricultural products, industrial products and 
services. Imports are again concentrated in goods and service imports have a minor share 
                                                  
48   A favorite destination is Spain, where the share of export of services in private household expenditures was 
corrected by 7.5% in the OECD 1995 input-output tables. This correction consists mainly of expenditures by 
foreign household in Spain. 
55 (of around 1%) in total household expenditures in most countries. This share is lower in the 
US than in Europe. Only in the UK service imports reach about 5% of total household final 
demand. These numbers suggest that domestic private household expenditure would be 
about 1 or 1.5% higher if no services were imported.   
One percent of overall household expenditures can be a high share if concentrated on a few 
items only, but this does not seem to be the case, as the lower panel of table 5.7 suggests, 
which displays the import shares in total household expenditures for detailed services. Table 
5.7 displays only the import share and neglects exports of private household services, 
therefore it overestimates the possible effect on the domestic market. In any case, 
conceptually the service import hypothesis is right, but the numbers are just too small to 
make service imports a major reason for lower service employment in Northern Europe.  
Table 5.7: Household final demand, imports in % of overall household final demand, 1995 (US 1997) 
US   UK   F   G   NL   ES  
Agriculture   17.2   24.6   14.2   40.7   51.8   24.5  
Industry   20.0   26.7   19.6   23.1   40.8   22.0  
Services   0.1   4.6   1.3   1.3   1.4   0.2  
In detailed services:          
Wholesale and retail 
trade; repairs  
-0.6   0.4   1.6   0.0   0.1   0.0  
Hotels and restaurants   0.0   14.9   0.0   3.2   0.0   0.0  
Transport and storage   4.2   20.5   6.3   6.6   8.9   3.7  
Post and 
telecommunications  
0.0   4.5   0.0   5.2   3.5   0.1  
Finance, insurance    0.9   1.6   3.1   0.6   3.7   0.3  
Real estate activities   0.0   0.7   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0  
Renting of machinery and 
equipment   0.0   3.0   0.0   0.1   4.8   0.0  
Computer and related 
activities   0.2   0.0   1.5   4.7   14.5   0.0  
Research and 
development   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0  
Other business activities   0.3   8.3   5.9   0.3   11.8   1.4  
Public admin. and 
defense; compulsory 
social security  
0.0   0.1   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0  
Education   0.4   0.6   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0  
Health and social work   0.0   0.5   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0  
Other community, social 
and personal services   0.0   7.6   2.5   3.5   3.2   0.0  
Private households with         
employed persons and 
extra territorial 
organizations and  
0.0   0.6   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0  
bodies          
Source: computations are based on the OECD input-output database for the 1990s 
  
56 5.5 DETERMINANTS OF CHANGING SERVICE SHARES: SHIFT-SHARE 
ANALYSIS  
The share of services in overall final demand clearly differs between countries and it changes 
over time. Overall final demand relevant for employment in an economy consists of private 
domestic consumption, government consumption, investment (including changes in stocks), 
and exports. The share of services in each of these final demand components differs and thus 
the share of services in overall final demand may change, (1) because service consumption 
increases within demand components (within effect), (2) because the relative weights of the 
final demand components (structural effect), and (3) because of the changes of the service 
share within components in interaction with the change of the weight of the components 
(interaction effect).49 The  latter is usually very small if the changes in the other two 
components are not too big.   
Table 5.8 displays the decomposition of the overall changes in the service shares in final 
demand into a within (change within the final demand components) and a structural (change 
in the weights of the components) component for current and constant prices for the period 
of the late 1970s and 1990, 1995 respectively.50 Again, the constant-price figures are 
somewhat lower than the current-prices figures reflected the higher inflation in services. For 
the period 1977 to 1990 the within and the structural effects reinforce each other in the US, 
the UK and France, which is –as mentioned earlier- due to the expansion of private 
consumption in the US and the UK but to public consumption in France. In the Germany, 
mainly rising exports caused the structural effect to be negative. Nevertheless, the within 
effect, which reflects the rise in service demand, rose in all countries but in Germany and the 
Netherlands (in the Netherlands data refers to 1985) the within effect was compensated by 
shifts in the structure of demand.   
Although the data for the mid 1990s is not fully comparable with that of the earlier periods, 
one can conclude that service demand within the final demand components continued to rise 
in all countries but surprisingly the US and the French structural effects are now negative. 
                                                  
49   
50   For the Netherlands data for 1990 is not available. For Spain input-output data is only available for 1995 (new 
OECD input-output tables). Data for the mid 1990sis not fully comparable to that of earlier periods because 
of changes in the classification and definitional changes in the 1993 SNA system.   
57 Part of the explanation is the investment in the US in the 1990s reducing the demand for 
services but also measurement problems are affecting the results. Software is defined as 
investment and therefore final demand in 1993 SNA but it was intermediate demand in the 
earlier SNA. Most important, however, is that the within effects continued to favor services 
in all countries displayed.   
Table 5.8 Shift-share analysis of the service share in final demand  
   
58 6 CONCLUDING SUMMARY: DEMAND AND SUPPLY, LEVEL 
AND STRUCTURE  
 
As developed in section 3, equilibrium employment in the domestic economy depends on 
demand and supply. The tremendous expansion of service sector employment observed in 
all highly industrialized countries result from both demand side and supply side trends. In 
theory the two are often assumed to equate by reference to Say’s law, but the two sides of 
the market actually follow different influences and at least at the sectoral level substantial 
deviations between demand and supply occur. In demand-supply space as in Figure 6.1 (see 
also Figure 3.1 in section 3) an initial situation is characterized by the combination of 
productivity and demand per head of population. This combination results in certain level of 
employment measured by the employment-population rate. Improvements in labor 
productivity lead to a move towards the origin, that is less labor is needed to produce a 
constant output and the economy moves necessarily to a lower employment-population 
rate. To remain at the same employment-population rate, demand per head of the 
population must rise proportionally to productivity. The level of final demand in the 
economy must take pace with the supply improvements (productivity growth) to keep the 
employment constant. Figure 6.1 shows in the upper diagram the productivity-demand 
combinations for the DEMPATEM countries in 1970. For the construction of the displayed 
curve the US values of 1970 were chosen. The curve connects all possible combination of 
labor productivity and demand, which result in the same employment-population rate as the 
1970 US combination. As one can easily see, the European DEMPATEM countries are with 
small deviations on the same curve as the US.   
In 1999, however, the US and the European countries are on very different curves than in 
1970 (lower diagram in Figure 6.1). The US raised demand per head more than productivity 
grew and consequently the US moved to a higher employment curve. The European 
countries (less so the UK and Spain) catched-up to US productivity levels but expanded 
demand less than productivity and consequently moved to lower employment in 1999.  
59 Figure 6.1 Economic trends in demand and supply space, aggregate economies 
 
Computations based on OECD (2000) Economic Outlook, ILO (2002), Key Indicators of the Labor Market. Curves: 
Y/pop=E/pop15-64*h*A, where pop = population 15-64,h = average working hours, A = labor productivity per hour. GDP per 
capita calculated using 1999 GK PPPs.  
 
Since the US and France, the Netherlands and Germany (though less the UK and Spain) are 
roughly at the same productivity level in 2000, the difference in employment must be related 
to a substantial part to aggregate final demand. However, that would be a mechanical 
answer, because it does not explain why the US raised demand per head of the population 
60 so much, whereas Europe remained at a comparatively lower level. For sure, a supply-side 
explanation referring to productivity growth only will fail because it would require the US 
and the European countries to remain on their initial employment curve and all countries 
should have been in narrow demand-supply cluster in 2000, which they are not.  
Almost similar levels of labor productivity in the US and the European countries also require 
additions to the prime explanation for a growing or higher share of service-sector 
employment -Baumol’s so-called ‘cost-disease’ model- as the main explanation for 
transatlantic employment differences. According to William Baumol’s model (1967, 2001) 
countries would achieve higher incomes per capita due to advancements in the technological 
progressive sectors (manufacturing) of the economy51 but spend incomes in fixed 
proportions on services and goods, which would result in rising relative prices for services 
and in a rising share of service employment. As shown by Victor Fuchs (1980) and restated 
for more recent trends in section 2 of this paper, the expansion of the service-employment 
share follows a remarkably stable pattern, which is actually surprising given the high number 
of variables potentially influencing service employment.  
The interesting but complex question then is, why in 1999 the US spends so much more per 
head of the working-age population (about 40% more) than the average European 
DEMPATEM country in 1999 PPPs) and involves a much higher share of its working-age 
population for much longer hours in formal economic activities than the European countries?  
Taking the international comparisons of productivity levels at face value, the larger US 
service share in employment cannot result from superior manufacturing productivity alone 
as the pure ‘cost-disease’ hypothesis suggests. Instead, there are also fundamental differences 
in the demand structure, which shifted the US to a higher service share in service 
employment.   
One answer may be that Americans are ‘workaholics’ and that Europeans prefer 
leisure over income. Other explanations may refer to differences in incentive 
schemes, differences in inequality and the like as it is very popular in the economic 
and political debate. However, referring to these fundamental differences in 
preference or institutions to explain the differences in employment is a big jump 
over a long chain of causal links and it requires substantial changes to have occurred 
since 1970 or so. This paper analyzed the possible reasons before the very general 
claims. It investigated some of the causal links related to the various components of 
                                                  
51   This line of reasoning requires ￿s, the ratio of service sector productivity over manufacturing productivity, to 
be lower in the US than in Europe because of higher manufacturing productivity, which seems not be the case 
although service productivity may be lower in the US (Beiley/ Solow 2001).   
61 demand and found systematic differences between the US and the European 
countries.  
Investigating the developments in the three broad sectors show a tremendous catch-up 
process of the European countries in agriculture productivity with stagnation of demand for 
agricultural products resulting in the well-known substantial decline in the labor force 
employed in agriculture. Also in manufacturing the catch-up process of the European 
countries is clearly visible. By the end of the 1990s the European countries roughly achieved 
US manufacturing productivity. Although demand for manufacturing products (remember 
that manufacturing is used here as a short-cut for a broader sector including construction 
and utilities) rose, the increase was less than the improvements in productivity causing the 
share of manufacturing workers in the population to decline in all DEMPATEM countries. 
The big difference between the US and DEMPATEM-Europe is concentrated in the service 
industries. Here as well productivity in Europe catched-up but in the US the growth in 
demand for services increased substantially more than the growth in productivity resulting in 
the observed substantial rise in service-sector employment. However, service demand rose 
everywhere at a higher pace than productivity grew in service industries, but the levels of 
service demand show remarkable differences between the countries.  
1) Does the higher share of service industries in employment in the US derive 
from a larger role of services in the structure of final demand, and is this gap 
growing?  
•   The US have a higher share of services in final demand of about 10%-points but all 
countries show a trend towards services in final demand.   
•   There is a clear trend to a higher share of services in final demand also in constant prices 
within countries. Using constant instead of current prices flattens the trend towards services 
in final demand but it remains.  
•   The lead of the US in the service share in final demand occurs in current and in constant 
prices but it seems stable over time.  
•   The bigger service sector in the US occurs in different data sets. Also as a share in value 
added the service sector in the US is bigger than in Europe.   
•   Overall services rise in relative prices whereas overall goods prices are falling in every 
country. Some service prices rise more than the average, but not all.  
•   Relative prices for goods rather than for services seems to be lower in the US than in 
Europe. This is mainly the result of relatively low prices for health and education in Europe, 
62 which are usually mixed public-private services in Europe. Other services, especially ‘market 
services’ have substantially lower relative prices in the US.   
•   Measured in international prices the gap in relative service demand between the US and 
the European countries narrows but the gap remains.   
 
2) Particularly, is consumer demand higher and growing more rapidly in the US? 
What  
is its impact on the production of services?  
and 
 3) What is the role of the pattern of consumption in this? I.e., do American 
households consume more services than European households and why? 
•    In all countries, private consumption is the most important demand component for 
services followed by government consumption, which, together, account for about 80 to 
95% of all final demand for servcies.   
•   Imports (and exports) of services are marginal in overall final demand and in household 
final consumption.  
•    In the US the share of private consumption in the overall demand for services is 
especially high, which favors the share of services in final demand.  
•   Especially the share of services in private consumption grew in the US,   
•   There is a clear trade-off between private and public expenditures on services depending 
on the national institutional arrangements. In part American households spend a higher share 
of their disposable incomes on services because they need to buy services, which are 
provided publicly in Europe.  
•   The share of individual consumption in total public consumption is much higher in 
Europe than in the US.   
•   Collective consumption in GDP is roughly similar in all countries. If anything it is higher 
in the US.  
•   There is no clear pattern in the US-European difference of private final consumption 
even in categories where public provision is unimportant (like ‘restaurants, hotels’) the 
pattern is divers. The UK and France have higher expenditure shares, Germany and the 
Netherlands have lower shares than the US.  
63 •    In the US with increasing importance up to the mid 1990s when investment grew 
substantially.  
•   The employment share in services seems to be influenced by the relative service 
productivity, which may be related to differences in skill structure and/or capital deepening.  
•   Demand per head of the population in working age is about 40% higher in the US than in 
Europe, which affects both goods and services.  
Summarized more generally, we find a clear trend towards services in final demand, which is 
not just nominal but real. Although part of the increased demand for services is due to 
prices for rising more for services than for goods, there is a trend towards a higher share of 
service in constant-price data as well. Thus, it must be the interplay of alphas –the share of 
services in real demand- and betas the relative service sector productivity, which is shaping 
the changes in the sectoral composition. Thus, among the major theoretical hypotheses to 
explain the expanding service sector as summarized in Section 3:  
α (relative demand for services)↑  Clark/ Fisher  
β (relative productivity of services)↓   Baumol  
β ↓ and α ↑  Fuchs  
 
this paper established evidence that alphas increased over time but also that betas declined 
over time. This is not surprising since the pure theories try to gain their clarity by more 
radical assumptions. However, for the US-Europe difference in employment it is important 
that not only demand in services seems to be higher in the US than in Europe but that also 
demand for goods is higher contributing to the US trade deficit, which tends to raise the 
share of relative service employment.   
It remains a major conundrum, however, why the US raised income per capita mainly by 
larger labor inputs in the 1970’s and 80’s (less so in the 90’s), which is most likely related to 
incentive structure in the US economy favoring the specialization of households (Freeman/ 
Schettkat 2002).   
The reason why demand did not keep pace with productivity improvements in the European 
countries may be related to aggregate macro-economic policy like the tight monetary policy 
but there is also a structural component to it. Since services are traditionally to a large part 
provided by the public sector in Europe but European governments restrained public 
expenditures across the board constraining the expansion of the service sector. Private 
demand for services could not fill this gap because disposable household income did increase 
immediately. Since most European countries decided to move to a higher share of private 
service provision and demand, they get into trouble in the transition period when household 
64 disposable income did not yet sufficiently increase but public provision of services has 
already been reduced. In this situation households have to substitute formerly public services 
by private expenditure.   
The most relevant questions for the design of future employment and economic policies 
seem to be in a better understanding of the underlying mechanism causing the very different 
economic dynamics in the US and in many European countries. First candidates are, of 
course, the differences in incentive structures, which may range from the impacts of non-
work income, taxes and contributions to income improvements related to carrier steps. A 
step  
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70 APPENDIX I: WORKING HOURS  
 
Working hour estimates, crucial as they are for the analysis of productivity, differ 
substantially between sources. For example, for the United States in 1990, the OECD 
reports 1838 hours per year (OECD Online Labor Market Statistics) and 1943 hours per 
year in its Employment Outlook of 2000, while Mary O’Mahoney and Angus Maddison 
(1991) report 1691 and 1604 (for 1989) respectively.   
Also between-country comparisons within datasets may show rather diverging numbers. 
O’Mahoney, for example, estimates that in 1990 Germans worked an average of 1611 hours, 
which is only 80 hours less than her estimates for the US. This seems too small of a 
difference, considering that Germans work fewer hours a week and take four more weeks 
of holidays each year, while part-time shares are comparable.  
Visual inspection of the graphs that plot the hour estimates of the different sources (which 
all claim to report actual hours worked) is quite revealing and shows that large discrepancies 
between data sources occur mainly for the US (Figure A1.1). There is much more agreement 
between sources for, for example, the Netherlands. By looking at the percentage difference 
between the maximum and the minimum value for 1990, one can get an idea of this 
discrepancy (see the rightmost column in Table A1.1). For the US, the difference was more 
than 20%, while for West-Germany this value was 1.8%. Although to a lesser extent than in 
the US, the UK also faces data problems, whereas the various sources give more consistent 
figures for the other countries with a variation of less than 10% in 1990.   
71 Fig. A1.1: Working Hour Estimates  
 







74 APPENDIX II: DEFINITION OF SECTORS IN THE INPUT-
OUTPUT DATA (UP TO 1990) 
 
Table A2.1: Definition of sectors in the input-output data (upto and after 1990)
52
  Until 1990   Mid 1990’s  
Primary   Agriculture, forestry & fishing   Agriculture, hunting, forestry & fishing  
(Agriculture)   Mining & quarrying   Mining & quarrying  
    
Secondary 
(Manufacturing)  
Food, beverages & tobacco Textiles, 
apparel & leather Wood products & 
furniture Paper, paper products & 
printing  Industrial chemicals Drugs 
& medicines Petroleum & coal 
products Rubber & plastic products  
Non-metallic mineral products  Iron 
& steel  Non-ferrous metals  Metal 
products  Non-electrical machinery 
Office & computing machinery 
Electrical apparatus, nec Radio, TV 
& communication equipment  
Shipbuilding & repairing  Other 
transport  Motor vehicles  Aircraft  
Professional goods  Other 
manufacturing Electricity, gas & 
water  Construction  
Food products, beverages & tobacco Textiles, 
textile products, leather & footwear Wood & 
products of wood & cork Pulp, paper, paper 
products, printing & publishingCoke, refined 
petroleum products & nuclear fuel Chemicals 
excluding pharmaceuticals Pharmaceuticals  
Rubber & plastics products Other non-
metallic mineral products Iron & steel Non-
ferrous metalsFabricated metal 
productsMachinery & equipment, n.e.c. Office, 
accounting & computing machinery Electrical 
machinery & apparatus, nec Radio, television 
& communication equipment Medical, 
precision & optical instruments Motor 
vehicles, trailers & semi-trailers Building & 
repairing of ships & boats Aircraft & 
spacecraftRailroad equipment & transport 
equipment n.e.c. Manufacturing n.e.c. & 
recycling Electricity, gas & water supply 
Construction  
    
Tertiary 
(Services)  
Wholesale & retail trade 
Restaurants & hotels Transport & 
storage  Communication Finance & 
insurance Real estate & business 
services Community, social & 
personal services Producers of 
government services  Other 
producers  
Wholesale & retail trade; repairs  Hotels & 
restaurants Transport & storage Post & 
telecommunications Finance, insurance  Real 
estate activities Renting of machinery & 
equipment Computer & related 
activitiesResearch & development Other 
business activities Public admin. & defence; 
comp. social security Education Health & 
social work Other community, social & 
personal services Private households with 
employed persons & extra territorial 
organisations & bodies  
 
                                                  








Table Class - 
USES NACE  
1   Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing   01-05   01-05  
2   Mining and quarrying   10-14   10-14  
3   Food products, beverages and tobacco   15-16   15-16  
4   Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear   17-19   17-19  
5   Wood and products of wood and cork   20   20  
6   Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing   21-22   21-22  
7   Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel   23   23  
8   Chemicals excluding pharmaceuticals   24ex2423   24  
9   Pharmaceuticals    2423   N/A  
10   Rubber and plastics products   25   25  
11   Other non-metallic mineral products   26   26  
12   Iron & steel   271 2731   27  
13   Non-ferrous metals   272 2732   N/A  
14   Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment   28   28  
15   Machinery and equipment, n.e.c.   29   29  
16   Office, accounting and computing machinery   30   30  
17   Electrical machinery and apparatus, nec   31   31  
18   Radio, television and communication equipment   32   32  
19   Medical, precision and optical instruments   33   33  
20   Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers   34   34  
21   Building and repairing of ships and boats   351   35  
22   Aircraft and spacecraft   353   N/A  
23   Railroad equipment and transport equipment n.e.c.   352, 359   N/A  
24   Manufacturing nec; recycling   36-37   36-37  
25   Electricity, gas and water supply   40-41   40-41  
26   Construction   45   45  
27   Wholesale and retail trade; repairs    50-52   50-52  
28   Hotels and restaurants   55   55  
29   Transport and storage   60-63   60-63  
30   Post and telecommunications   64   64  
31   Finance, insurance    65-67   65-67  
32   Real estate activities   70   70  
33   Renting of machinery and equipment   71   71  
34   Computer and related activities   72   72  
35   Research and development   73   73  
36   Other business activities   74   74  
37   Public admin. And defence; compulsory social security   75   75  
38   Education   80   80  
39   Health and social work   85   85  
40   Other community, social and personal services   90-93   90-93  
41   Private households with employed persons and extra 
territorrial organisations and bodies   95-99   95-99  
42   SBFD + adj     Non-Residents 
Spending  
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